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1 Introduction 
”Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”1 
 
The present thesis will explore a topic that might, indeed, sound like magic for the reason 
Arthur C. Clarke suggested in the quotation above. Regardless of the possible first impression, 
the subject is, as shall be shown in the thesis, actually really timely. Autonomous technology 
forms a set of technology that is pushing itself in many aspects of social conduct. 
Technological innovations have shaped international relations, and thus international law, 
throughout centuries. The improvements in shipping contributed to the work of Hugo 
Grotius2; the horrors at the battle of Solferino and contributions the battle made to 
humanitarian law3 were partly due to new arms technology; and the new technologies 
introduced in world wars forced humankind to seek new ways of governing international 
relations through United Nations4. There are countless examples of such technological 
development that has led to new social behaviour and change of legal doctrines. Truly, the 
development in technology has been answered with new rules, interpretations of law and 
ways to govern the international social sphere of nations. 
The future will ultimately show the degree of autonomy given to technologies. Yet, it is 
already very timely to start to do legal, ethical and political analysis on the topic. It is certain 
that the need for such analysis grows greater as the development of technology changes the 
                                                     
1 Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the future: an inquiry into the limits of the possible (Revised Ed., Harper & Row, 
1973) at 21. 
2 Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, (1609) in Robert Feenstra (Ed. and Annotate) Hugo Grotius Mare Liberium 
1609-2009, with general Introduction by Jeroen Vervliet (Brill Academic Publishers: Leiden 2009). See also 
e.g:  Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian 
Moments (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013) at 13-27. 
3 International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC), ‘150 years of humanitarian action: The Battle 
of Solferino’, 09.07.2014, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/audiovisuals/video/2014/150-
years-solferino-bugnion.htm, Last checked 15.12.2014. 
4 Charter of United Nations (hereinafter UNC), 26th June 1945 San Francisco, in force 24th October 1945; and 
Bruno Simma (Ed.) Hermann Mosler, Albrecht Randelzhofer, Christian Tomuschat and Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(collaboration) Helmut Brokelmann and Christian Rohde (Ass. Eds.) The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994). 
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life of every one of us. The applications of these types of technologies are close to limitless, 
and thus the change in social life will definitely be grand. In the present thesis the focus will 
solely be on international law. Further, the topic will be narrowed to the question of state 
responsibility for autonomous systems (also hereinafter AxS5) and thus this study is going to 
contribute to a rather narrow, yet important, aspect of the legal discourse of this new and 
interesting phenomenon. 
1.1 Problem statement and framing of the topic  
In the present thesis the aim is to explore the doctrine of state responsibility in the context 
of autonomous systems. In this framework, there are two main purposes of the thesis. Firstly, 
this is an academic Master’s thesis and as such the aim is to produce basic legal research on 
the topic. The objective is to contribute to the wider legal discourse of responsibility in the 
particular context of autonomous systems. The analysis will show the legal premise for the 
upcoming state usage of these systems. Hence, on the academic meta-level the purpose will 
be to examine the degree of ‘Grotian moment’6 that is inflected by AxS in the international 
relations. 
Secondly, the present thesis has been contracted by the Finnish Defence Forces to contribute 
their research on the legal aspects of autonomous systems. Pursuant the wishes of the 
customer, the closer and more detailed analysis of the topic will concentrate on a fairly 
limited set of issues. Consequently, these two purposes have both contributed to the actual 
problem statement of the thesis.  
The actual research will be done in the following way. Two main research questions are: 
1. What are the main legal issues when applying the state responsibility in the context 
of autonomous systems? 
2. What special questions arise from the framework of state responsibility regarding 
manufacturing, testing and using autonomous systems? 
                                                     
5 AxS meaning: A=autonomous, x= all domains (water, land, air and cyber), S=systems. 
6 Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian 
Moments, supra note 2. 
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Given the limited possibility to go through every imaginable aspect of responsibility, some 
explicit framings have to be made early on. Firstly, the focus of the thesis will be on the state 
responsibility doctrine. This excludes some other notions of responsibility such as 
(international) criminal responsibility and responsibility of international organisations7. 
Reasoning behind this decision was to limit the horizontal spreading of the topic. In fact, both 
criminal responsibility and responsibility of international organisations remain crucially 
important for the autonomous systems analysis but that particular research needs to be done 
in separate occasion. Second framing is related to the scope of state responsibility. State 
responsibility will be analysed mainly in the context of state responsibility doctrine of the 
International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC)8. The major limiting notion within this theory 
is internationally wrongful acts9. However, some attention will be given to the notion of 
liability which is based on the notion of non-prohibited acts in international law10. Both of 
these aspects, still in the context of states and not e.g. international organisations, are 
included in the present thesis to show the different responsibilities that state might be 
invoked either in the context of wrongful acts or damage11. This type of analysis will show, 
rather clearly, the limits of two different doctrines and applicability of them in the context of 
autonomous systems. The third major framing is to exclude jurisdiction issues and possible 
convictions based on international state responsibility. The decision not to include these 
issues is due to the willingness to concentrate on the questions of responsibility. Jurisdiction 
issues would open the topic too much. The framing is definitely not to downplay the 
importance of jurisdictional analysis. The last explicit framing in the present thesis is to limit 
the analysis on non-compensation or non-reparation part of state responsibility and liability 
doctrines. Arguably this framing will limit the analysis to aim and triggering the factors of 
                                                     
7 See e.g. Dermot Groome, ‘Evidence in cases of mass criminality’, in Bantekas, Ilias, and Emmanouela 
Mylonaki (Eds.) Criminological Approaches to International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2014) 117-158. Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009). 
8 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries: 2001, 
(hereinafter ARSIWA) (ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II[2]). 
9 See chapter 2.2.2. 
10 See chapters 2.3.7. 
11 See e.g. James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 
2013) at 49-51. 
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responsibility and liability. Indeed, by framing compensations outside of the thesis, it is 
possible to concentrate on the allocation of a wrongful act, attribution, definition of state 
agent, circumstances precluding wrongfulness, ultra vires action, joint-actions of state, acts 
not prohibited by international law and (even) the role of due diligence more closely than it 
would have been possible otherwise. The analysis of the compensations remains crucial for 
the overall notions of responsibility and especially liability12. Therefore more research needs 
to be done on that topic as well. It is the purpose of the present study to use framing 
described above to truly achieve the answers to the research questions.  
The main research questions will be answered throughout the thesis but more precisely the 
structure of the thesis will be following. Firstly, in the introduction chapter the outline and 
premise of the thesis will be introduced. This includes inter alia explaining the significance of 
the topic. In chapter 2, the factual background and legal framework of the thesis are 
introduced. Firstly, the chapter begins with non-legal analysis where the focus is in the 
definition of autonomous systems. Then is the legal framing of the thesis. In this analysis the 
concept of responsibility is opened from sources to application of the doctrine of state 
responsibility, and partly liability, in the context of autonomous systems. Indeed, the chapter 
provides the detailed analysis of the main legal concepts. In chapter 3 manufacturing, testing 
and using issues of the autonomous systems will be analysed through scenario analysis. 
These scenarios are made to represent case study that does not exist yet. The aim is to 
introduce two examples of applying the state responsibility theory in the present and rather 
complex context of autonomous systems.  
1.2 Significance of the subject 
The notion of responsibility is arguably at the heart of any legal order13. Indeed, it can be 
argued to embody the meaning of the rule of law. Simultaneously it provides tools for the 
                                                     
12 James Crawford, State Responsibility, supra note 11, at 480-485. 
13 See e.g. Gen. commentary, ARSIWA, supra note 8; Alain Pellet, ‘The Definition of Responsibility in 
International Law’, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (Eds.) and Kate Parlett (Ass. Ed.) The 
Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 3-16 at 3-5; Malcom N. Shaw, 
International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008), at 778; Ian Brownlie, System of 
the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1983) at 1-6; Martin Dixon, Textbook 
on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 242-244; Attila Tanzi, ‘Is Damage a Distinct 
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conceptualisation of legal relationships between subjects of law after a breach of a norm.14 
While responsibility as such can be seen as empty signifier in that it carries no detailed 
explanation of the consequences or implicit rules of attribution in itself15, the role of the 
notion as critical part of legal order is absolutely clear16. 
The responsibility of states has long been in the centre of discourse for international 
responsibility and thus international law itself17. The importance is mainly due to (sovereign) 
state-centrism in international relations and also international law18. So called Lotus Rule 
explains this state centrism in international law in the following way: ‘Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed’19. Following the formulation, state 
                                                     
Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful Act’, in Marina Spinedi and Bruno Simma (Eds.) 
United Nations Codification of State Responsibility (Oceana Publications, Inc.: New York, 1987) 2-33 at 2; Katja 
Creutz, ‘Law versus Codes of Conduct: Between Convergence and Conflict’, in Jan Klabbers and Tuomo 
Piirainen (Eds.) Normative Pluralism and International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013) 
166-200 at 181-197; and Paul McDonough, Magdalena Kmak and Joanne van Selm, ‘Sharing Responsibility 
for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered’ (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2008) 1-
35. 
14 Alain Pellet, ‘The Definition of Responsibility in International Law’, supra note 13, at 6-11; and 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment Law (2nd Edition, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2004) at 8.  
15 More on the empty signifiers from e.g. Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (Verso: London, 1996) at 36-40. 
16 See e.g. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 74 (1938) 11, at para. 28;  
S.S. “Wimbledon” (United Kingdom, France, Italy & Japan v. Germany), Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 1 (1923) 
16, at para. 50; Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (Germany v. Poland) (hereinafter Factory at Chorzów case), 
Judgment No. 8, PCIJ Series A, No. 9 (1927) 1, at para. 106; Corfu Channel, Merits (United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 23; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities) (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, at 142 and 146; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997) 7, at 38; Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1950), p. 221 at 228; Claim of Finnish Shipowners 
against Great Britain in Respect of the Use of Certain Finnish Vessels during the War (hereinafter Finnish Ships 
Arbitration) (Finland v. Great Britain), 3 RIAA (1934), 1479-1550 at 1984-1985, 1947 and 1501-1502; and 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports (1980) 3, at 31. 
17 See e.g. James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson, ‘Preface’, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and 
Simon Olleson (Eds.) The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010) V-VII at 
V; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?’ 72 (1) 
British Yearbook of International Law (2001) 337-356 at 337-339; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations (hereinafter Reparation for Injuries Case), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
(1949), at 15 para. 185. 
18 Susan Marks, ‘State-Centrism, International Law, and the Anxieties of Influence’, 19:2 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2006) 339-347; Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, suppra note 13, at 1-13; See also: 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument – Reissue with 
New Epilogue (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005), at 224-303 especially 240-245.  
19 The Case of the S.S. "LOTUS" (France v. Turkey) (hereinafter Lotus case), Judgment, PCIJ, Series A, No. 70 
(1927) 5 at 18.  
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responsibility has to be considered as specific form of responsibility regardless that the 
notion of responsibility is also legally relevant in the contexts of e.g. international criminal 
law20 and international institutional law21. Currently state responsibility is best formulized in 
the ILC articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and its 
commentaries (hereinafter ARSIWA)22. The significance and scope of these articles are 
profoundly shown in the present thesis. Consequently, these articles will be at the centre of 
this thesis as well. Taking into account the role of the ILC as codifier (and possible creator) of 
international customary law, the examination of the usability of state responsibility doctrine 
is important in itself23. Further, given the complexity and uncertainty concerning non-legal 
section of the present thesis, analysis of state responsibility gains even more overall 
significance. 
Autonomous system ought to be understood as a new step in technological development. 
Actually, AxS is a system of machines (or algorithms) performing tasks with less amount (or 
potentially totally without) of human involvement in somewhat unpredictable 
circumstances24. These technologies have a huge potential to change many areas of human 
life – from individual civilian application to systemic military concepts. The development 
process has both hardware and software components. These vary quantitatively and 
qualitatively depending on the contexts. Both components have developed into direction to 
allow more autonomy for machines already for many years. Still, so far the most of these 
systems have lacked many aspects to be called ‘autonomous’ as such – perhaps with some 
exceptions such as autonomous trading agents. Even the theoretical possibility to have ‘fully 
autonomous’ systems in the sphere of present understanding can be questioned.25  
                                                     
20 See e.g. Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, at 397-399; See also: Ian Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law (7th edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) at 433-436. 
21 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) at 179-180. 
22 ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
23 ILC, ‘Infroduction - Origin and background of the development and codification of international law’, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm, Last checked 15.12.2014 
24 See chapter 2.1. 
25 Sharon Weinberger, ‘Next generation military robots have minds of their own’ BBC, 28th September 
2012, http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120928-battle-bots-think-for-themselves, Last checked 
19.01.2015; Keith Wagstaff, ‘Future Tech? Autonomous Killer Robots Are Already Here’, NBCNEWS, 15th 
May 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/future-tech-autonomous-killer-robots-are-already-
here-n105656, Last checked 19.01.2015. See also: Panos Toulis, Dionisis Kehagias and Pericles A. Mitkas, 
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The comprehensiveness of these new technologies is arguably changing the behaviour 
patterns in many areas of social life. The present thesis consists both an attempt to define 
autonomous systems and the legal state responsibility perspective. The latter is done both in 
general terms and through scenario analysis.26 The aim is through the scenarios to illustrate 
the possibilities in the field of autonomous systems, the changing role of human agent and 
the challenge this brings to debate on state responsibility27. All these aspects are under heavy 
debate in the international sphere and there are attempts to set boundaries for these 
technologies even before they have entered in generic use28.  
It seems at the moment that much emphasis is globally given to the development of 
autonomy of technology29. In addition to mere technical solutions, the debate is also heating 
in terms of law, ethics and politics of these systems30. Based both on the development of 
technology and recently warmed debate, it seems that there is no doubt concerning future 
significance of the autonomous systems. Similarly, the state responsibility doctrine seems a 
fruitful way to approach this phenomenon. The doctrine is at the heart of international law 
and therefore state responsibility issues are the questions that have to be very clear from the 
very start when these technologies appear on e.g. battlefields. Actually, while revealing the 
most important parts of state responsibility (such as breach of obligation or attribution) in 
the context autonomous systems, one is also be able to expose other problematic aspects of 
law towards AxS. For example, the state responsibility doctrine presumably helps to 
understand due diligence obligations of states acting in the context of autonomous systems.  
To summarise, based on the importance of the legal doctrine and the material substance, it 
                                                     
‘Mertacor: A Successful Autonomous Trading Agent’, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ptoulis/harvard-
homepage/content/mertacor_classic.pdf, Last Checked 17.10.2014. For more see chapter 2.1. 
26 Annexes 1 and 2.  
27 Chapter 2.1.1. 
28 ICRC, ‘Expert Meeting: Autonomous Weapon Systems Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects 
Geneva’ (Switzerland 26th To 28th March, 2014) https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1707/4221-002-
autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf, Last checked 15.12.2014, 2-102; Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots, ‘Statements’, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/statements/, Last checked 19.01.2015. 
29 MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, in MCDC, Focus Area “Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access” 
Policy Guidance Autonomy in Defence Systems (SACT HQ, Norfolk, 2014), 14-18. 
30 ICRC, Expert Meeting: ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems Technical, Military, Legal And Humanitarian Aspects 
Geneva’, supra note 29; and Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, ‘Statement’, supra note 28. 
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is easy to establish that research of AxS in the context of state responsibility is very topical 
and there is good reason to believe that it will contribute to the future research of the topic. 
1.3 Methodology 
Methodologically the present thesis can be seen to consist of two parts. The first part of the 
thesis follows traditional legal research31. This methodological framework can be described 
as doctrinal. This type of analysis is analysis of the black letter of the law32 which tries to 
describe the contemporary normative framework. The reason for this approach is firstly to 
conceptualise the notion of state responsibility as it is presented in contemporary 
international law – e.g. in the ILC’s articles and legal literature. Secondly, the aim is to bring 
legal weight and constancy to the analysis of autonomous systems.  
The second part (chapter 3) of the thesis is scenario based analysis. Methodologically this 
part is a combination of independently structured scenarios and doctrinal applicability of 
relevant state responsibility, and partly liability, rules. The purpose is to demonstrate through 
scenarios the material issue (AxS) and the legal doctrine of state responsibility in more 
practical context. The scenarios are not written as narratives but rather as a set of 
circumstances which describe the situation. Hence, the analysis in the context of scenarios 
might concentrate on rather particular issues – not the whole doctrine of state responsibility. 
Therefore methodologically scenarios are a way to specify and reveal some chosen aspects 
related to the issues of state responsibility for autonomous systems.   
                                                     
31 See e.g. Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International Law (North Holland: Amsterdam, 1984). 
32 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui (Eds.) Research Methods of the Law (Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2007) at 3-4.  
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2 Factual Background and General Analysis 
In this chapter the high level legal and technical-operational frameworks of the thesis are 
presented and analysed. Firstly, in chapter 2.1 the technical and operational framework of 
the thesis is described. The objective in this chapter is to provide enough factual 
understanding of AxS for the purposes of legal analysis. Secondly, in chapter 2.2 the concept 
of responsibility is introduced from the historical and present day perspectives. The aim is 
both to explain the background of the present doctrine of responsibility and to put it in the 
contemporary context of state responsibility. Thirdly, in the chapter 2.3, more detail aspects 
of state responsibility doctrine are introduced. This part of the chapter 2 consists of detailed 
analysis of the state responsibility doctrine, and for the relevant part liability as well.  
2.1 Introduction to the technical and operational framework 
This chapter provides basic information concerning autonomous systems including general 
aspects of the operational use – given that it is relevant for the purpose of this thesis. 
Obviously, it is not reasonable or even possible to cover the whole phenomenon of the 
autonomy of technology33. Hence, closer framing of the phenomenon is done in sub-chapters 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2 and then applied in the context of state responsibility later in chapter 2. These 
definitions explained in the following sub-chapter also form background for the scenario 
analysis in chapter 3 as well. 
2.1.1 The background and development of autonomous systems technology  
There is a good reason to believe that autonomous systems, as they are somewhat peculiarly 
called, will constitute huge change in social behaviour. Development of these systems, and 
getting ready for the world filled with them, is in the agenda of many international agents – 
including states.34 Indeed, for example in the publications of the National Defence University 
                                                     
33 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, ‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban 
Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can’ 11 American University Washington College of Law Research 
Paper, Columbia Public Law Research Paper (2013) 1-33. 
34 Pääesikunnan Sotatalousosasto, Teknologinen kehitys: Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2020: STAE 2020, 
osa 1 (Edita Prima Oy: Helsinki, 2004) at 557-558; See also e.g. John Markoff, ‘Fearing Bombs That Can Pick 
Whom to Kill’, New York Times, 11th November 2014; and Yong Zhang, Brandon K. Chen, Student Member, 
Xinyu Liu, and Yu Sun, ‘Autonomous Robotic Pick-and-Place of Microobjects’ 26:1 Ieee Transactions On 
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of Finland authors have taken autonomy into account for years. These analyses have 
indicated huge potential in the development of autonomy.35  
The starting point for the analysis is the fact that the term autonomous system might create 
wrong implications of the phenomenon. In the present thesis autonomous systems represent 
a sort of action engaged by a system of machines that could be described ‘autonomous-like 
behaviour’36. Truly, from philosophical perspective autonomous system, if constructed by a 
human, cannot really be autonomous. The reason is that if a human has programmed 
algorithm to perform tasks, it has been the human who has decided the structure of the code. 
Additionally, by setting parameters for given operation, human is influencing the action of 
‘autonomous system’. Hence, the autonomy in its purest sense is always relative – at least in 
the foreseeable future.37 Despite the mentioned logical problem with the concept, it has 
gained ground in the public debate38. Thusly, for the purpose of the present research the 
autonomous systems is the term used in it, yet, it does refer to autonomous-like features. 
Keeping in mind the limits of the concept, it is easy to understand that discussions concerning 
autonomy, as technical solutions, has risen from the framework of automatisation and 
automatic systems. The main issue is that both types of technologies are invented to perform 
certain tasks. The difference between the tasks that on one hand autonomous systems and 
on the other automatic systems are able to perform is in increasing complexity in an 
                                                     
Robotics (2010) http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5342467, Last checked 
08.01.2015, 200-207. 
35 Pääesikunnan Sotatalousosasto, Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2020 […] osa 1, supra note 34, at 287-289, 
355-431 and 557-558; Pääesikunnan Sotatalousosasto, Teknologinen kehitys: Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 
2020: STAE 2020, osa 2 (Edita Prima Oy: Helsinki, 2004) at 16-19, 45-46, 400-401; Mikko Kari, Arto Hakala, 
Elisa Pääkkönen ja Markku Pitkänen (Eds.), Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2025: STAE 2025: osa 1: 
Teknologinen kehitys (Puolustusvoimien Tekninen Tutkimuslaitos: Ylöjärvi, 2008) at 256-259, 330-336 and 
366-406; and Mikko Kari, Arto Hakala, Elisa Pääkkönen ja Markku Pitkänen (Eds.), Sotatekninen arvio ja 
ennuste 2025: STAE 2025: osa 2: Puolustusjärjestelmien kehitys, (Puolustusvoimien Tekninen Tutkimuslaitos: 
Ylöjärvi, 2008) at 13-15, 23-24 and 32-33. 
36 MCDC, ‘Ethical Issues’, in MCDC, Focus Area “Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access” 
Policy Guidance Autonomy in Defence Systems (SACT HQ, Norfolk, 2014), 18-23 at 19. 
37 MCDC, ‘Ethical Issues’, supra note 36, 18-23. 
38 Pericle Salvini, Giancarlo Teti, Enza Spadoni, Emiliano Frediani, Silvio Boccalatte, Luca Nocco, Barbara 
Mazzolai, Cecilia Laschi, Giovanni Comandé, Emanuele Rossi, Paolo Carrozza and Paolo Dario, ‘An 
Investigation on Legal Regulations for Robot Deployment in Urban Areas: A Focus on Italian Law’ 24 
Advanced Robotics (2010) 1901–1917; and Aaron Mehta, ‘U.S. DoD’s Autonomous Weapons Directive Keeps 
Man in the Loop’, Defence News, 27th November, 2012. 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121127/DEFREG02/311270005/U-S-DoD-8217-s-, Last checked 
19.01.2015.  
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uncertain environment. The tasks for autonomous systems are such that they need more 
complexity than pre-programmed action.  
The motivation for changing the tasks from human to automatic, or even to autonomous, 
machine or system vary greatly depending on particular context.39 Still some generalisation 
can be made. Obviously, the major issues with automatisation (and autonomisation) of tasks 
is creation of efficiency – regardless of the task. Efficiency in this sense can mean everything 
from better monetary value to saving human lives.  
It is easy to understand that technological solutions themselves might vary between for 
example under water systems and aerial based systems40. The operational, technological 
and, indeed, ethical, legal and social connotations alter through change of domains. Hence, 
before the technology is acting autonomously, designer has to concentrate on the specifics 
of the platform – from more than one perspective. The question of platforms includes both 
software and hardware elements41. Actually, the autonomous system platforms are now 
facing many similar problems as for example computers and mobile phones have faced. This 
is especially true in the context of the operating system and hardware providers. Therefore 
the basis of technical and operational limits of a given autonomous system is already set 
when choosing operating domain and platform. New innovations are solving these problems 
and are providing ground-breaking solutions. The limits of technical capabilities, both in 
software and hardware sense, are moving towards rather autonomously capable systems – 
including weapon systems42. 
                                                     
39 Noel Sharkey, ‘The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Protection of Civilians’ 3:2 
Law, Innovation and Technology (2011) 229-240; and Yueh-HsuanWeng, ‘Beyond Robot Ethics: On a 
Legislative Consortium for Social Robotics’ 24 Advanced Robotics (2010) 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=weng_yueh_hsuan, Last checked 
08.01.2014, 1919–1926. 
40 Pääesikunnan Sotatalousosasto, Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2020 […] osa 1, supra note 34, at 355-431. 
41 See e.g. DARPA, ‘Autonomous Robotic Manipulation (ARM), Defense Sciences Office’, 
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/DSO/Programs/Autonomous_Robotic_Manipulation_%28ARM%29.aspx, 
Last checked 19.01.2015.  
42 DARPA, Autonomous Robotic Manipulation (ARM), supra note 41; See also e.g. Pääesikunnan 
Sotatalousosasto, Teknologinen kehitys: Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2020 […] osa 2, supra note 35, at 404-
408; Kate Ramien, ‘Drones and robots look to the future’ Namoi Valley Independent, 9th January 2015, 
http://www.nvi.com.au/story/2439866/drones-and-robots-look-to-the-future/?cs=373, Last checked 
19.01.2015; Adam Clark Estes, ‘IBM's New Brain-Like Chip Squeezes One Million Neurons On to a Stamp’, 
GIZMODO, 8th July, 2014, http://gizmodo.com/ibms-new-brain-like-chip-squeezes-one-million-neurons-o-
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In conclusion, it needs to be underlined that fully and truly autonomous systems do not exist, 
nor are probable to exist in the foreseeable future. Human influence presumably remains as 
a feature of the systems in the foreseeable future. Indeed, humans have their roles for 
example in a making the decisions to build or programme a system or in feeding the specific 
parameters into AxS. This is true regardless whether these people make mistakes or cause 
unintended consequences through their actions. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind 
that the term autonomous systems refer always to systems with autonomous features.  
2.1.2 Different degrees of autonomy in technical systems  
For the purpose of the present thesis, the level of autonomy is especially important part of 
discussion and there are multiple ways to conceptualise the question of autonomy43.  Thusly, 
the approach chosen here is made for the purpose of the present thesis and it is an attempt 
to sufficiently encompass the major elements of contemporary discussions. Simultaneously 
this issue represents much of the criticism that autonomous systems are facing – especially 
in weapon context. 44 
The conceptualisation of autonomy could be done by categorizing the degrees of autonomy. 
One way to do that is to compare the operational possibilities to the role of human. Indeed, 
the categorisation attempts to put a difference between the degrees of control of humans – 
thusly defining autonomy of systems in question. The nature of connection between the 
operator and system is crucial. The Royal Academy of Engineering has conceptualised the link 
in a following way:  
• controlled systems: where humans have full or partial control, such 
as an ordinary car 
                                                     
1617642003, Last checked 19.01.2015; Jing Guo, Gangfeng Yan, Zhiyun Lin, ‘Local control strategy for moving-
target-enclosing under dynamically changing network topology’ 59 Systems & Control Letters (2010) 654-661. 
43 The Royal Academy of Engineering (hereinafter RAE), ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical 
Issues’ (The Royal Academy of Engineering 3 Carlton House Terrace: London, 2009) 
http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/autonomous-systems-report, Last checked 19.01.2015, 1-15 
at 2. 
44 RAE, Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues, supra note 43; Noel Sharkey, ‘The evitability of 
autonomous robot warfare’ 94:886 International Review of the Red Cross (2012), 787-799; ICRC, ‘Report of 
the ICRC Expert Meeting on […] - MEETING HIGHLIGHTS’, infra note 56. 
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• supervised systems: which do what an operator has instructed, 
such as a programmed lathe or other industrial machinery 
• automatic systems: that carry out fixed functions without the 
intervention of an operator, such as an elevator 
• autonomous systems that are adaptive, learn and can make 
‘decisions’. 45 
The division into four levels describes the main elements of the nexus between operator and 
system quite well. Especially the definitions of controlled and autonomous systems are the 
clearest categories. Indeed, these two are quite to the purpose of the present thesis as well. 
At this point it is not necessary to analyse software or hardware parts of such systems in a 
more detail level.46  
The difference between supervised and automatic systems seems to be unnecessary for the 
purpose of this thesis. Especially problematic is the scope of definition of automatic system. 
For the purpose of the current analysis, automatic systems are part of other mentioned 
systems. Even the controlled systems often include automatic part(s) within them47. On the 
other hand capability to act without supervision is a feature in autonomous systems48. That 
is why automatic, as defined above, is either a feature in a system or a particular feature in 
an autonomous system – mainly the capability to act alone49.  
For these reasons the analytical framework for different degrees of autonomy is divided in 
three. These are called: in-the-loop; on-the-loop; and of-the-loop50. All of them refer to the 
role of an operator of the system in question. These terms have been used by some 
                                                     
45 RAE, ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues’, supra note 43, at 2. 
46 Recall chapter 2.1.1. 
47 RAE, ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues’, supra note 43, at 2 and 6-8. 
48 RAE, ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues’, supra note 43, at 6-10. 
49 RAE, ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues’, supra note 43, at 2-10. 
50 Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic: Human Rights Program at Harward Law 
School, ‘Review Of The 2012 Us Policy On Autonomy In Weapons Systems’ (2013) 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/4.2013%20Review%20of%20US%20Policy%20on%
20Killer%20Robots.pdf, Last checked 8.1.2014, 1-9 at 2-4; UNDIR, ‘Framing Discussions on the 
Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies’ (2014) 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-weaponization-of-increasingly-
autonomous-technologies-en-606.pdf, Last checked 19.01.2015, 1-11 at 8-11. 
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scholars51. In-the-loop systems are such where an operator is almost constantly in control of 
the system. In these situations the operator is actively making the decisions and controlling 
the activities52. Still, even in in-the-loop systems there might be some parts that are 
automatized, such as breaks or defensive mechanisms53. Many times the automatisation is 
added to these in-the-loop systems because of the tempo that the activity of system 
requires54. Still, in in-the-loop systems, the overall control and decision-making capabilities 
are in the hands of the operator – such as drones for example55.  
On-the-loop systems are supervised but still rather automatized systems. It is evident that an 
operator has a different role compared with the in-the-loop systems. The operator’s active 
part is when she or he feeds the mission parameters or operation requirements into the 
system. It is then the system itself that adapts to these commands – following its algorithm.56 
The mission requirements are in many cases numerical and explicit – not descriptive. 
Obviously this depends on the algorithm and how it is coded. Additionally, operator, as a 
supervisor, has the capability to take control of the system and change it to an in-the-loop 
system57.  
Off-the-loop systems are remarkably different. Off-the-loop systems act autonomously in 
non-predictable circumstances including certain learning and decision-making capabilities58. 
The role of the operator in an off-the-loop system is to observe also mission but especially 
the results. Additionally, the follow-up action is then partly initiated by the operator or the 
                                                     
51 Noel Sharkey, ‘Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous Targeting’ 9:4 Journal of Military Ethics (2010) 369-383 
at  370-371; and see also: Wenchao Li, Dorsa Sadigh, S. Shankar Sastry and Sanjit A. Seshia, ‘Synthesis for 
Human-in-the-Loop Control Systems’ Tech. Rep. No. UCB/EECS-2013-134 (17th July 2013) 
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-134.html, Last checked 19.01.2015, 3-14. 
52 Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic: Human Rights Program at Harward Law School’ 
Review Of The 2012’, supra note 50, at 2-4. 
53 RAE, Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues, supra note 43, at 2. 
54 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Matthew Waxman, ‘Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to 
Autonomous Weapon Systems’ 90 Stockton Center for the Study of International Law [INT’L L. STUD] (2014) 
386-411 at 388. 
55 Jyri Kosola, ’Disruptiiviset teknologiat puolustuskontekstissa’ (Pääesikunta - materiaali osasto: Helsinki, 
2013), 1-26 at 6-11. 
56 ICRC, ‘Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on “Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects” - MEETING HIGHLIGHTS’, (Geneva, 26th-28th March 2014) 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons-icrc-report-2014-05-
09.pdf, Last checked 19.01.2015, 1-16 at 6. 
57 ICRC, ‘Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on […] - MEETING HIGHLIGHTS’, supra note 56, at 11. 
58 See e.g. RAE, ‘Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues’, supra note 43, at 2; and 
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operator head-quarter. In off-the-loop systems, the operator could still have capability to end 
the mission or to communicate with the off-the-loop system – at least when it is physically 
possible.59 It is therefore characteristic of a pure off-the-loop system that it can go through 
its mission without active control or even supervision.  
It is important to understand that the purest form of off-the-loop systems are not yet in use 
– as far as it is possible to know. Some systems might be close to be off-the-loop but in the 
operational sense they are rather confined and also their off-the-loop capabilities are 
limited60. It is also unlikely that pure off-the-loop systems would be developed in the near 
future. Especially systems, which do not have a ‘kill-switch’ to end the operation, are 
unlikely61. Some operational capabilities, such as the capability to make decision to fire, are 
also features that are at least debated at the moment62. It is clear that this type of decisions, 
like all the actions done by AxS, are subjected to international and national law to its full 
extend. So, even this type of decisions should have to follow humanitarian law – when 
applicable of course.  The learning feature, in its full sense of the word, is rather problematic 
as well. Yet, the limits of artificial intelligence cannot be defined or predicted preciously. 
Cognitive processes are likely to be part of off-the-loop systems eventually63. To summarise 
off-the-loop systems, in their purest meaning, they are unlikely but to some extend 
foreseeable. Also these systems are the clearest examples of autonomous systems.  
It is also very typical for all the systems above that the complexity regarding algorithms and 
operational capabilities is a precondition. Even in-the-loop systems are developed towards 
such direction that the code embedded within them is rather intricate. This is many times 
accompanied with the encryption protection and legal obligations that the code cannot be 
unpacked. Indeed, the manufacturer might easily want to protect the code by asserting limits 
for the decryption of the algorithm. These aspects are very problematic from the end user 
perspective since it is very hard to be convinced about the limits of operational capabilities. 
                                                     
ICRC, ‘Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on […] - MEETING HIGHLIGHTS’, supra note 56, at 9-12.   
60 Keith Wagstaff, ‘Future Tech? Autonomous Killer Robots Are Already’, supra note 25.  
61 See technology programs e.g. United Kindom Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, ‘£9 million 
available for future of Maritime Autonomous Systems’, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/9-million-
available-for-future-of-maritime-autonomous-systems, Last checked 19.01.2015. 
62 MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29, 14-18; and ICRC, ‘Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on […] - 
MEETING HIGHLIGHTS’, supra note 56, at 9-12. 
63 Jyri Kosola, ’Disruptiiviset teknologiat puolustuskontekstissa’, supra note 55, at 20-21. 
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Such uncertainty is very problematic also from the legal perspective – including responsibility 
perspective. Actually, it is almost impossible to get confirmation of the operational 
capabilities based either on cytological or contractual reasons. Hence, one of the main issues 
for the end user is to solve the complexity dilemma as well as possible. 
Following the categorization above it might be possible to think that the degree of autonomy 
is easy to determine. The position in the present thesis is that the determination remains 
complicated. Indeed, the degree of autonomous features is rather relative. When trying to 
define autonomous systems the key issues to consider are system’s connection towards 
humans and its operational capabilities. In this sense, off-the-loop system is the purest form 
of autonomous system. Yet, on-the-loop systems might also be so close to system that has 
‘autonomous capabilities’64 that they could be described as autonomous systems as well. 
Indeed, the most important is to realise the potential of autonomous like features and 
operational changes that they bring.  
2.2 Introduction to state responsibility 
In this section of the thesis notion of state responsibility will be covered in a general level. 
Later in the thesis the concept will then be applied in the technical context of autonomous 
systems. Additionally, in this chapter the aim is to keep the primary focus on the rules of state 
responsibility, however, it is also necessary to introduce some elements from sources of 
international law and historical aspects of international responsibility to give more concrete 
and complete framework for the analysis.  
2.2.1 Sources of the state responsibility 
For the purpose of the present thesis it is reasonable to discuss the issue of the international 
law sources. The importance of the analysis is especially in the special nature of sources 
related to the concept of state reasonability65. Additionally, the knowledge of the vast 
amount of relevant sources and their inter-relations is useful for understanding the complex 
regulatory framework of autonomous systems. The emphasis in the present analysis is in the 
                                                     
64 See chapter 2.2.1. 
65 ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
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‘official’ sources of international law and not that much the ontological sources of law66. By 
the official sources it is referred to those sources that are explicitly described in the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ)67. The issue of sources is not, obviously, 
this simple but there remains much complexity that cannot be solved through the analysis of 
the present thesis68. It is the argument in the present thesis that even rather simple analysis 
of the sources will be beneficial later when analysing the applicability and nuances of state 
responsibility doctrine.  
There is an important dichotomy between consent and justice that needs to be addressed 
before dealing with the actual sources of international law.  Understanding this nexus helps 
to understand possible new legislation that might appear in the future regarding security 
issues and autonomous systems. Indeed, the dichotomy is a good way to conceptualise the 
origin of sources of international law. For example, international treaty law seems to be the 
culmination of the state party acting through sovereign power and showing consent to be 
bound by rules69 - but this is only one way to create new legislation in the area. Indeed, there 
are critical inadequacies within the theory of pure consensualism asserting itself – called also 
as apologism70. For example consent cannot explain all the epistemological and ontological 
backgrounds of the international legal sources. At the same time relying purely on the idea 
of justice, and hence morality, remains insufficient for the total explanation for the origin of 
                                                     
66 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, at 70; Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International 
Law, supra note 31, at 48-49. On law as normative concept see: Jan Klabbers and Tuomo Piirainen (Eds.) 
Normative Pluralism and International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2013).  
67 ICJ, ‘Statute of the International Court of Justice’, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0, 
Last checked 15.12.2014. See also e.g. David Kennedy, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in Martti 
Koskenniemi (Ed.), International Law (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited: Aldershot, 1992) 294-388 at 
294-302; and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, supra note 20, at 3-4. Compare e.g. Antônio 
Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind (2nd revised edition, The Hague Academy of 
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2013) at 113-138. 
68 See e.g. Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International Law, supra note 31, at 51-56. See also: Martti 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 309-325. See also e.g. P. E. Corbett, ‘The Consent of 
States and the Sources of the Law of Nations’, in Joseph Weiler and Alan T. Nissel (Eds.) International Law: 
Critical Concepts in Law, Volume II, Fundamentals of International Law I (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: 
London, 2011) 5-13. 
69 See Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex) (hereinafter VCLT). 23rd May 1969, in force 27 
January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 
(hereinafter Legality of Nuclear Weapons Case separate), Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume (translation), 
ICJ Reports (1996) 287 at 291-292.  
70 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 309-312 and 332-333. 
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sources as well. One of the main problems is that the notion cannot escape the utopia of 
natural morality71. Obviously only relaying on justice would collide with the notion of 
sovereignty of states72. Hence, the position in the present thesis is that the epistemological 
background of the sources is based on both consent and idea of justice through custom, 
general principles and different interpretation – letting the topic to be open-ended73. It is 
especially through the interpretation of the nuances of state responsibility that the notion of 
justice has gained importance in the area of the present thesis. It is also important to 
understand that because sources of law are related to both state consent and more 
normative idea of justice, the relevant legal sources for the discussion about autonomous 
systems are rising from the both legalistic and political traditions of international behaviour. 
As the final note, the whole issue is culminated around the fact that international system 
lacks a parliament initiating global laws and system of courts validating comprehensively and 
compulsorily the interpretation of these laws74. It makes the dichotomy even more politically 
problematic.   
Pursuant Article 38 of the ICJ Statute the sources are: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
                                                     
71 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 309-333. 
72 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 320. 
73 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 364-365 and 385-387, see also 303-387. 
74 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, at 69-71. See also e.g. Michael Akehurst, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law (George Allen and Unwin LTD: London, 1970) at 16-22; Hilary Charlesworth, 
‘Law-making and sources’, in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (Eds.) Surabhi Ranganathan (Ass. Ed.) 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2012) 187-202; and 
Benedict Kingsbury, ‘International courts: uneven judicialisation in global order’, in James Crawford and 
Martti Koskenniemi (Eds.) Surabhi Ranganathan (Ass. Ed.) The Cambridge Companion to International Law 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2012) 203-227. 
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various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide 
a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”75 
Article 38 provides the exhaustive list of sources applicable by the Court. In addition to 
concrete types of sources in Article 38(1), Article 38(2) allows the Court to settle a dispute 
following the rule ex aequo et bono (to decide on the basis of equity and justice). According 
to Hilary Charlesworth, by the year 2011, the provision of Article 38(2) had not been used ‘in 
the International Court’76. Hence, this type of sources will not be further analysed. This is not 
to say that autonomous systems could not theoretically provoke such cases in the future. 
Yet, because of the lack of such cases, it seems rather unfruitful to just invent such situations. 
The hierarchy between the sources is, as the main rule, following: the provisions a, b and c 
are in sense equal and d is, as described subsidiary – for the Court to consider77. The issue 
between treaty and custom needs more attention78 and it will be dealt later. Definitions 
between customary law and general principles of law are famously left unclarified in the 
Article itself.79 This issue will also be addressed later in this sub-chapter.  
The purpose for the whole analysis of the sources is to give clarity to them in the context of 
state responsibility and to underline to a reader what weight ought to be given regarding the 
AxS. It needs to be emphasised that the framework could be a topic of its own.80 Indeed, for 
the purpose of this thesis, perhaps the three main questions related to sources are: what are 
general features of these official sources, what weight ought to be given to separate source 
                                                     
75 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 67.  
76  Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Law-making and sources’, supra note 74, at 189.  
77 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, supra note 20, at 3-6; and Michael Akehurst, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law, supra note 74, at 59. See also: Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 
supra note 18, at 307; Leonard M. Hammer, A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive 
Thoughts for Normative Issues (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, 2007) at 9-13; Jan Klabbers and Silke 
Trommer, ‘Peaceful Coexistance: Normative Pluralism in International Law’, in Jan Klabbers and Tuomo 
Piirainen (Eds.) Normative Pluralism and International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013) 
67-93 at 92-93. 
78 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, supra note 74, at 59. 
79 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 67.  
80 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra note 18, at 303-385 Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law, supra note 20, at 4-19; Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International Law, supra 
note 31, at 3, 56-57, 62-75; and preamble and Art. 26 VCLT, supra note 69, at 332.   
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groups, and especially what is the relevance of the work done by the ILC from the perspective 
of sources. The answers to these questions will provide the background for the responsibility 
issues of autonomous systems.  
Treaty obligation is obviously seen as binding in international law. The reasoning is based on 
the display of consent by the ratifying state.81 Based on the principle pacta sund servanda, 
which is an old customary law obligation and later also on VCLT treaty law obligation to the 
majority of states82, treaty law obligations are very much the core part of international law.83 
Regarding the substantive treaty law obligations, at present there are no conventions 
regulating specifically autonomous systems or making them illegal as such84. However, there 
are many treaties that impose treaty obligations in the areas related e.g. to operational 
environment of AxS85. One could argue that for the most of the states the whole sphere from 
planning, construction, selling and employing of AxS is full of treaty law obligations. This could 
be argued regardless of the fact that the treaty law obligations are based on the consent of 
states. There are treaties that are widely ratified hence putting obligations to great number 
of countries at once86. From the perspective of state responsibility, treaty law is crucial 
especially for primary rules which are explained later in the thesis. Indeed, it is impossible to 
come to a conclusion that treaty law does not deal with autonomous systems just because 
there is no convention addressing the phenomenon specifically.  
                                                     
81 See e.g. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, supra note 20, at 3-6; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, supra note 16, at 136-137; and Geir Ulfstein, Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmerman, 
‘Introduction’, in Geir Ulfstein (Ed.) and Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmermann (in collaboration) Making 
Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007) 
3-12 at 4-5.  
82 Preamble and Art. 26 VCLT, supra note 69; see also e.g. Malcom N. Shaw, supra note 13, at 94. 
83 Preamble and Art. 26 VCLT, supra note 69; see also e.g. Malcom N. Shaw, supra note 13, at 94. 
84 See e.g. MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29; Nils Melzer, ‘Legal Implications of Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems’ (The CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, United Nations: 
Geneva) 
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le/Melzer_LAWS_IHL.pdf, Last checked 19.01.2015. 
85 MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29; Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Matthew Waxman, 
‘Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems’, supra note 54, at 398-406.  
86 See e.g. Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection 
of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) (with annexes, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference 
on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts dated 
10 June 1977 and resolutions adopted at the fourth session) (hereinafter Additional protocol I) Adopted at 
Geneva on 8 June 1977, Registered by Switzerland on 23 January 1979. 
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Customary law is the second source mentioned in Article 38(1) of the Statute. The basic way 
to conceptualise customary law is that it consists of two parts: (a) general, uniform and 
consistent state practice which is (b) accompanied with opinio juris meaning the belief of 
legal premises of the behaviour in question.87 This has also been called ‘two element 
approach’88. These two elements mean that it remains in the shoulders of the claimer 
(whether applicant or respondent) to show both of them when invoking customary law. 
Question is then what qualifies as the evidence of state practice or opinion juris. The 
elements that would suggest the existence of customary law are for example: actions, 
comments and other performances of state power (wherever it may be observed, for 
example General Assembly, hereinafter GA)89, the judgments of ICJ90, the judgments of 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ)91, the judgments of other courts 
applying international law92, and crucially the work of the ILC93. 
Perhaps the most contemporary development regarding the customary law is the reframing 
work recently started by the ILC. In 2012 they set a topic ‘Formation and evidence of 
customary international law’94. In the context of this work the special rapporteur proposed 
as the definition of customary law following: ‘(a)”Customary international law” means those 
rules of international law that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law’95. 
By representing the cutting edge view of to the customary law, these suggestions to the ILC 
                                                     
87  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, supra note 20, at 6-12; Martin Dixon, Textbook on 
International Law, supra note 13, at 31-36. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (hereinafter North Sea 
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88 Michael Wood, Second report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special 
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91 Lotus Case, supra note 19, at 26. 
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2008) http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icty/icty_e.pdf, Last checked 15.12.2014, 1-6 at 2. 
93 ILC, ‘Formation and evidence of customary international law/Identification of customary international law’ 
(2014) http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.htm, Last checked 15.12.2014. 
94  Michael Wood, supra note 88, at 2. 
95 Michael Wood, supra note 88, at 7. 
23 
 
 
by the special rapporteur explain two elements – derivation and reflection of the general 
practice as law96. 
Based on the nature of customary law, two especially relevant aspects for the purpose of the 
thesis remain. On the one hand, there is not that much data concerning state practice, 
especially combined with opinion juris, related to AxS as such97. The state practice that exists 
surely is not universal at the moment – not the least because of absence of global use of 
autonomous systems. However, it is always possible that such state practice based on the 
opinio juris starts to emerge and that could create new binding international legislation 
related to autonomous systems in the future.  
Second aspect is that the customary law is visible in the context of state responsibility 
doctrine both in primary and secondary98 norm sense. The position adopted in the present 
thesis is somewhat a simplification representing perhaps dogmatic view on the role of the 
ILC99. The original purpose of the ILC was to codify customary law100. Indeed, it has been the 
role of the ILC to codify, and in some sense develop, international law from the very beginning 
of law commission101. From the perspective of consent as premise of international law, this 
is rather problematic. It is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve this problem. The doctrinal 
position that has been adopted here is based on the idea that, at the very least, the great 
majority of the ILC’s work reflects customary law. The justification is that the ILC has not as 
such created law that would be unacceptable for international community. It might be a 
problematic position to occupy in wider sense. But for the purpose of this study it is accurate 
enough. 
                                                     
96 See more Michael Wood, Second report on identification of customary international law, supra note 88. 
97 See AxS called “Monstermind”: James Bamford, ‘The most wanted man in the world’ Wired, 22th August 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/, Last checked 19.01.2015.  
98 See chapter 2.2.2.  
99 See e.g. ILC, ‘Introduction: Origin and background […] of international law’, supra note 23; and H.E. 
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Regarding the main source of this thesis, the ILC’s ARSIWA, the role of ILC as codifier of 
customary international law is somewhat complex as well102. Indeed, there is no absolute 
certainty that all articles of that document reflect customary law103. For this reason, in the 
present thesis a simplification has been done to presume that ARSIWA does reflect the 
contemporary international law without the detailed analysis of the issue. Detailed analysis 
of the customary law nature of each and every article of ARSIWA would have been impossible 
to do within the scope of the present thesis. The decision made here is based on the fact that 
the ILC has worked with ARSIWA for long period of time – the topic was first brought up in 
the first session of the ILC in 1949 and the articles were adopted by the ILC in 2001104. It needs 
to be underlined that the status of ARSIWA is a draft that has been adopted by the ILC.  
Still, it is possible to presume that at least the majority of them reflects the position of states. 
Additionally, very similar state responsibility notion has been referred to several times during 
the decades.105 Also, the articles have gained importance in the context of the investment 
disputes regardless that the rules have originally meant for the use of state system 
disputes106. As a criticism it might be argued that the compensation part of ARSIWA is 
somewhat contested since by merely observing state behaviour one can see that the conduct 
of states does not support globally followed compensation system for internationally 
wrongful acts107. But since compensations have been framed out of the present thesis this 
will not cause problems.  
The work of the ILC concerning the state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and 
liability in the case of absence of wrongful acts are good examples of that codification of 
customary law108. Hence, from the perspective of the present thesis customary law is a 
                                                     
102 Sir Michael Wood, ‘Statute of The International Law Commission’, supra note 101, at 2. 
103 Eric. A. Posner and Alan Sykes, Economic Foundation of International Law (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
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Comission to the General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 1956) at 49-50. See also: Responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts, GA Draft. Res. A/RES/62/61, 6th December 2007. 
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108 See more chapter 2.2.2 onwards. 
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crucial part of the international legal framework. While the contemporary customary law is 
indeed applicable, the future behaviour of states may add limitations to these rules – for 
example in the context of the harm that is allowed to be caused109. It is therefore customary 
law that might end up being the most regulating force of autonomous systems - at least 
before comprehensive treaty on autonomous systems.  
The third category of international law is the general principles of law. It is perhaps the most 
ambiguous source of law. Firstly, it needs to be noticed that ‘civilized nations’ part is not 
relevant for all practical purposes110. Otherwise the content remains unexplained in the 
Statute of the Court. Commentators have argued it to include notions like: ‘principles of 
consent, reciprocity, equality of states, finality of awards and settlements, the legal validity 
of agreements, good faith, domestic jurisdiction, and the freedom of the seas’111. Following, 
general principles of law seem to contain a long history and the core of law itself112. 
Therefore, examples of general principles can be found through comparative analysis of 
domestic sources113.  
The relevance of general principles is embedded with all the action taken in the context of 
AxS. Obviously, general principles are especially important in the governance and setting up 
the explicit international laws concerning the autonomous system. These principles form 
such primary norms that cannot be challenged and might in certain context also support the 
secondary norms of state responsibility as well. It is therefore clear that these norms are 
relevant for the analysis of autonomous systems and state responsibility. Additionally, 
general principles are great tools for the interpretation of other norms in the AxS context as 
well.114  
                                                     
109 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, 
(hereinafter: Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm) (A/56/10, ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II[2]. 
110 Hilary Charlesworth, Law-making and sources, supra note 74, at 189. 
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In the contemporary debate, the category d of Article 38(1) is perhaps the most topical way 
of ‘locating’ (and perhaps implicitly creating) international law in the area of autonomous 
systems115. The category d contains two elements: judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists. These two possess different qualities as sources of law116. 
Firstly, the judicial decisions are not binding as such but they show the elements and 
existence of customary law117. Indeed, the ICJ for example does not strictly follow the 
doctrine of precedence but previous cases are still quoted by the Court as reasoning118. 
Therefore judicial decisions might be considered as subsidiary interpretation tools or even 
the evidence for other sources of law, namely customary law or general principles of law.  
The teachings of highly qualified publicist on the other hand are providing additional advisory 
material for the Court(s). Yet, regardless that there are many who have contributed to the 
international legal thought as such, there are not too many who have actually be quoted by 
the judges of the Court as such119. Indeed, the ICJ judgements themselves seldom include 
straight references to the individual authors. However, dissenting and separate opinions tend 
to include such authors much more often. Also, oral pleadings before the Court might include 
references to this category as well.120 Hence, it is clear that the most highly merited academic 
debate does influence the application of international law as well. In the context of present 
thesis judicial decisions are extremely important guidelines to the application of primary and 
secondary rules of international law and state responsibility. There is a lot of contemporary 
academic debate over autonomous systems – including issues of international law121. Also, 
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the autonomous systems debate is linked to other debates within the area of international 
law – as targeted killing for example122.  
The question, what are the sources of international law, is closely linked to the question why 
are international obligations still followed in such large scale and even in cases when it might 
be against state’s narrow self-interest123. One needs to remember that even somewhat 
complex applicability of international law in courts124 is only one way to invoke international 
law. In other contexts, for example as part of general foreign politics, agents might use other, 
and non-globally accepted, sources as well. It is important to understand that those 
arguments might not carry the same weight in the ICJ, as they do in the domestic courts or 
domestic politics of that country.  Indeed, in addition to juridical procedures, international 
law has value in politics, policies, communications, economics and warfare125. These different 
ways of utilization of international law affect automatically the amount of applicable sources 
for the particular purpose. When discussing the issue of autonomous systems and 
responsibility of states, it is easy to see situations where something is claimed to be against 
or in accordance with international law – regardless of the sources the argument is based on. 
Still, especially since autonomous systems are just about to rise to popular use, the old 
formulations of international law are the reference points for contemporary legal analysis. 
Consequently, while there still remain complicated issues related the application of 
sources126, it is somewhat clear that there are particularly specified sources that are 
applicable at the court level of international law. These sources are emphasized in the current 
thesis.  
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2.2.2 Background for the law of international state responsibility  
The historical discussion in this chapter is to provide context for the contemporary 
conception of responsibility. The starting point is that the historical notion of responsibility 
gives proper understanding of the development of the concept. It also makes easier to point 
out the most important parts of contemporary conception. Additionally, knowledge of the 
historical developments of the concept might help to understand possible future aspects and 
needs that evolution of the concept might bring. 
The idea of state responsibility was evolved from more general understanding about legal 
responsibility127. The Roman law idea of jus gentium128 formed the early legal basis of 
responsibility in societies throughout Middle Ages. The term has its origin in the idea of 
collective responsibility which meant that an wrongful act of a foreign subject automatically 
justified response against the collective in question. From this notion onwards the theory of 
responsibility evolved towards differentiation of private acts and public acts – gradually but 
somewhat steadily.129   
The evolution of the idea of responsibility moved crucially forward when Hugo Grotius stated 
in the early 1625 edition of his book De Jure Belli Ac Pacis that ‘there arises an Obligation by 
the Law of Nature to make Reparation for the Damage, if any be done.’130 Regardless that 
Grotius did not in the quotation above explicitly differentiate between individual and state 
responsibility, in the translation of the 1646 edition of the book131 he did comment on the 
responsibility of ‘community’ on actions of its subjects by arguing that: ‘A community, or its 
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rulers, may be held responsible for the crime of a subject if they know of it and do not prevent 
it when they could and should prevent it’132. According to Grotius, community was not seen 
responsible for all action taken by individuals but liability might have risen because of the act 
or negligence of that community133. This formulation he put forward was the basis for the 
notion of later (state) responsibility. Indeed, greatly because of Grotius, and other authors 
who echoed134 and developed the idea135, the theory of complicity (instead of complicity 
some call it classical136) became the dominant framework of responsibility. Pursuant the 
theory, the state was responsible for acts of individuals if the state was complicit in the acts 
of individuals by not preventing (patientia) or punishing (receptus)137. According to some 
authors the theory included a right of  a sovereign to make claims also on behalf of other 
than their own subjects138 The most relevant criticism of the theory started after the Janes 
Case139 because several jurists thought that the distinction between public and private 
realms were not respected properly140. Therefore complicity was amended to condonation 
theory. According to it, the responsibility did not rise through complicity but the ‘failure to 
prevent and punish the wrongdoing amounted to a ratification or “condonation” of the act 
thus making it their own’141. This theory then continued to develop into contemporary theory 
of state responsibility.  
Clearly, the concept of damage and duty to make reparations formed the core of pre-modern 
responsibility argument. Here, the most notable precondition for responsibility was the 
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appearance of damage. The notion could thusly be described as damage based 
responsibility.142 Pursuant the Grotian and early post-Grotian theories, the understanding 
was that the damage suffered formed new relation between states in question resulting in 
responsibility and reparations143. This view formed legal premise until the first part of the 
20th century144. The reason for it was mainly due to the Westphalian system of states and the 
concentration of power and security dominance145.   
The contemporary view on responsibility, which will be introduced in more detail in the 
following chapter(s), is more complex than just a system of compensations for damages. In 
fact, there are three major shifts compared with the classical continuum started by complicity 
theory: 1) responsibility is not only a matter of state following the fragmentation of 
international law and multiplication of (very least potential) subjects of international law146; 
2) the damage is no longer the requirement of responsibility; and 3) the notion of liability has 
evolved to a separate concept.147 
Consequently, the original idea that action taken leads to a new legal relationship between 
the actors in question has remained the same. However, legal conditions and content of that 
action have changed dramatically148. Actually, the contemporary formulation of 
responsibility and state responsibility especially, is not civil or criminal but rather a new type 
of notion relationship149.  
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2.2.3 Contemporary regime of state responsibility (and other forms of 
responsibility including)  
Contemporary state responsibility is the most comprehensively formulized in the ILC articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), and its 
commentaries150. The codification of state responsibility was one of the first issues on the 
ILC’s agenda in 1949151.  However, it needs to be highlighted that this was not the first 
attempt to codify state responsibility152. Yet, the ILC’s process has been so far the most 
comprehensive and, at least to some extent, successful. During the decades, the ILC’s work 
included reports from special rapporteurs153 and multiple readings of the draft articles154. 
Obviously, this work has been commented, accompanied and applied with courts cases155 
and multiple writings of several authors156. Finally, these articles were adopted in the fifty-
third session of the ILC. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of the work, the legal force of 
these articles has also faced some criticism157. This criticism has to be taken seriously when 
considering the usage of the articles. Still, as already said, in this occasion ARSIWA will be 
held to represent the contemporary view of state responsibility in international law.  
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Pursuant ARSIWA, states are responsible for international wrongful acts, including omissions, 
if these acts or omissions are attributable to them under international law158. Therefore, the 
first thing to observe is that it is internationally wrongful act, not damage, which is 
precondition for state responsibility159. Following this premise, one can conceptualise two 
types of norms160. Firstly, a primary norm establishes an international obligation161. The 
obligation is the standard which, if violated, would form internationally wrongful act. The 
other norm type is the secondary norm and their purpose is to: “provide for the consequences 
of the breach of primary obligations”162. This division is somewhat artificial and its acceptance 
was heavily debated during the ARSIWA drafting process. Still, the accepted model of division 
between the norms is in a general level rather unproblematic.163 Indeed, it has to be held 
that division has its purpose regardless artificial aspects it might contain.  
As explained before, the breach of an obligation can be done by an act or an omission. 
Indeed, there is no substantial difference whether wrongfulness is due to an explicit act or 
committed because of an omission. From the perspective of state responsibility doctrine 
both are equal.164 Also, the primary norm obligations can arise from any source of 
international law165. There is no discrimination between them – still keeping in mind the 
relevance of different types of sources166. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to 
analyse all the possible material breaches in any given context. This is also the case 
concerning autonomous systems. However, through specification of the context, breaches 
of the primary norm can be narrowed at least to a certain level. In the present thesis, this 
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exercise is done in Chapter 3 through scenario analysis. Hence, clearly the context specificity 
is very important in the modern state responsibility doctrine167. Based largely on the 
specificity requirement of state responsibility situations ARSIWA was structured to contain 
secondary norms which mainly concentrate on the establishment of attribution, reasons to 
preclude wrongfulness and different elements of consequences of breaches168. These will be 
analysed in more detailed way in the following sub-chapters. 
In the context of contemporary state responsibility doctrine, the notion put forward by 
Hersch Lauterpacht, concerning the general development of international law, seem to be 
quite relevant. Pursuant the theory, the progress of international law is based on the 
domestic law – such as property, contract or procedure169. The development of the general 
notion of responsibility into the contemporary state responsibility doctrine seemed to have 
followed this pattern – at least to a certain extent. However, simultaneously it can be argued 
that, similarly to development of general international law, the lack of enforcement has 
hindered functioning of the state responsibility regime. This has separated it to a particular 
type of international regime.170 Therefore the contemporary state responsibility system 
includes the notion of states being responsible for internationally wrongful acts but it does 
not specify consequences of those acts from the enforcement perspective. ARSIWA includes 
provisions concerning compensations171 but because it lacks tools of enforcement, their 
effect of them can be criticised. Yet, the impact of the international law created by these 
draft articles is in crystallising the contemporary formula of state responsibility.  
2.3 Applicability and limits of contemporary state responsibility in the 
context of autonomous systems  
The premise for the thesis is that the general elements of the doctrine of international law 
and state responsibility are applicable in the context of the AxS172. There is no foreseeable 
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reason to think otherwise. Yet, much complexity remains regarding the actual application. 
The issues of attribution, determining the agent of state and state action, circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness and ultra vires actions are such issues that have specific features in 
the context of autonomous systems. Additionally, due diligence and acts not prohibited by 
international law will be discussed as well, however, these features are there to help to 
understand the complex limits of state responsibility doctrine – not to divide the attention 
as such. Obviously, the emphasis is all the time on relevant issues for autonomous systems. 
2.3.1 General applicability of the doctrine 
The heating debate over the legal aspects of autonomous systems has so far produced rather 
little depth analysis on the precise issue of state responsibility and AxS. The ones so far are 
meant mainly to be discussion openers on the policy level173. It seems that the topic of state 
responsibility has been shadowed by the greater interest towards humanitarian law, 
targeting reasons and legality of autonomous weapons in general174. Though, some 
commentators do recognise the importance of state responsibility doctrine in the 
autonomous weapon systems context as well175.  
Regardless of the lack of comprehensive state responsibility analysis so far, it has already 
been established that there is no legal reason why the doctrine of state responsibility would 
not be applicable in context of autonomous systems176. The applicability of state 
responsibility is not technology or action specific. Indeed, from the perspective of state 
responsibility, these new technologies do not change general aspects of state responsibility 
as such. As lex generis, the state responsibility rules argue that all internationally wrongful 
actions which are attributable to state fall within the scope of the doctrine. The international 
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wrongful acts are acts have to be defined by an international norm – regardless of the origin 
of the norm177.  In the Rainbow Warrior case it was noticed:  
The reason is that the general principles of International Law 
concerning State responsibility are equally applicable in the case of 
breach of treaty obligation, since in the international law field there 
is no distinction between contractual and tortious responsibility, so 
that any violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever origin, 
gives rise to State responsibility178  
It is thus clear that every action that is a breach of international obligation gives rise to state 
responsibility also in the context of autonomous systems. The applicability of the doctrine 
cannot be questioned. Applicability of the doctrine would also need the attribution of an act 
to a state. This question will be dealt in next sub-chapter since it cannot be separated from 
the question of state agent.  
In addition, it needs to be mentioned that there might be liability questions related to the 
harm caused to another state even in situations when there are no breaches of international 
obligations. This doctrine of international law will be discussed later in the thesis as well. 
Though, from applicability perspective, it is important to realize that breach of an obligation 
and causing harm could form under two different legal doctrines.  
2.3.2 Internationally Wrongful Act, State Agent, Act of State and Attribution 
In this chapter the main focus is on internationally wrongful act, attribution of an act to a 
state and the definition of a state agent. These aspects are inseparably linked in the AxS 
context as well. It is therefore crucial to define what could be described as the basic elements 
of wrongful act in this context; who can be an agent of state; and what kind of actions by 
them can be constituted as state action. After that the requirements of attribution of such 
acts will be discussed. Obliviously, throughout the chapter the focus is in the context of AxS.  
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It needs to be established that autonomous systems are not, even in military use, illegal per 
se179. In fact, in order AxS to be illegal there ought to be either a general norm (lex generalis) 
or special norm (lex specialis) to forbid use, effects or the used materials of autonomous 
system in question180. The first one would need specifically related norms prohibiting 
autonomic actions of machines. There does not exist one. There are ethical concerns made 
by some181 but not legal rules specifically demanding that human has to be the one making 
decisions. Regarding the effects of autonomous systems there exists many rules limiting the 
allowed action, the scope of the effects and minimum due diligence regarding preparations 
and building of autonomous systems.182. Yet, if all of these primary rules are met, it is hard 
to see the reason why AxS could invoke state responsibility.  
As said, the uses of autonomous systems are subjected to all the norms of international law 
as any new technology. For example in military context AxS has to be able to make distinction 
between military and civilian targets183, follow principle of avoiding the superfluous injury 
and indiscriminate weapon prohibition184 as any new operational and technological change. 
The obligation to take these issues into account is almost a universal treaty obligation for any 
weapon systems developer185. Similarly non-weapon systems are subjected to specific rules 
regulating domain in question186. From international wrongful act perspective this means 
that norm breaches can the most probably be found from the functions of the system. 
Indeed, without a separate action that leads to a norm breach, AxS itself would not constitute 
international wrongful act. Such breaches can arise from any area of international law – e.g 
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maritime law or law of armed conflict. In the context of such a breach, wrongful act can be 
invoked pursuant the general rule of state responsibility.  
The question of the state agent is somewhat case specific. However, some clear cut rules and 
interpretations do exist. The most evident issues of state agent are disclosed in ARSIWA187. 
The main rules are that conduct of any state organ and individual acting on behalf of a state188 
is an act of a state if they are empowered by law to exercise elements of governmental 
authority189. It is actually enough if a person or group of persons: is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct190. 
In these situations acts are attributable to that state even if an individual or an organ: 
‘exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions’191. Also, in ARSIWA there is a special 
provision if act is conducted in the absence or default of official authorities: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an 
act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority 
in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of 
authority.192 
The most notable issue from autonomous systems perspective is that it is always a human 
that creates the condition of attribution. In this sense attribution is not due to that system 
itself but because of the human behind it. In addition, according to the articles a state can 
acknowledge action, which would not otherwise be attributable to it, as its own and thus 
making the act of that particular state193. These situations were perhaps the clearest 
examples of attribution. To conclude, in normal situations conduct of regular citizens is not 
attributable to state. This provision includes exemptions which are discussed later194. 
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It is also worth mentioning that attribution will change if a state organ is placed at the disposal 
of another state. In this very precise and limited case, the acts of that organ are attributable 
to the new state in question.195 Finally, the attribution of conduct in cases of insurrectional 
or other such movement is also regulated in the articles196. These situations would also 
change the attribution of those units operating AxS accordingly. 
Regarding the issue of attribution, the main rules are rather simple. The matter itself is the 
main part of the secondary norms of state responsibility doctrine. Pursuant ARSIWA 
attribution is a requirement for state’s international wrongful act197 and, as explained above, 
the conduct of any organ or person acting in official capacity will entail such attribution198. It 
is necessary to underline that state act can also be an omission199 which in the context of 
autonomous systems might be as probable as ‘positive’ action. Hence, even when the rule of 
attribution is clear, the actor and act of state are defined in particular context always 
separately200. In the AxS context, the analysis seems to be even more relevant since the 
machine itself is not an agent of a state and thus the ‘act of state’ is not de jure done by 
autonomous systems. In order to illustrate this, it is useful to take a look at similarly 
technologically orientated area of law, for example so called international cyber law (or 
international information law)201.  The rule of attribution has been applied in the cyber 
warfare context by the international law specialists of NATO202. According to this so called 
Tallinn Manual, the mere fact that an act is taking place through (cyber) infrastructure is not 
an automatic proof of attribution203. This logic has already been applied in the context of 
                                                     
195 Art. 6 and Commentaries (1-9), ARSIWA, supra note 8.   
196 Art. 10, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
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199 Art 2, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
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Excellence, in Michael N. Schmitt General (Ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
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203 International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
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autonomous systems Policy Guidance as well204. Indeed, there has to be a person or a group 
of persons who constitute the responsibility of state. The technology only points out those 
people. Though in real life situations, it will vary how easy it is to establish the attribution – 
depending on an autonomous system in question. 
Therefore following ARSIWA, the AxS itself cannot be the state agent205. The entity of state 
is someone who can act on the capacity of a state as explained earlier. Since, in a legal sense, 
a machine cannot act on behalf of a state as a human or an entity of humans do. This would 
mean that it is the status of operator that decides whether the applicability of a state 
responsibility doctrine is fulfilled. It is rather obvious that the degree of autonomy of AxS is a 
crucial factor when one is making the determination who is this person. The three different 
degrees of autonomy206 has to be dealt differently since in every context the role of the state 
agent is different.  
Firstly, if a human is in the loop, the AxS is actually just a technical solution fully controlled by 
the operator and the command hierarchy in place. Thus, in this context the state agent is 
clearly the operator, and possibly his superior in accordance with responsibilities of 
superiors207. Hence, in these cases attribution to the state clearly exists. In the second 
scenario, a human is on the loop – supervising the actions of AxS. In this context, the state 
agent is again the operator and his superior. I would argue this since the action of the AxS is 
controlled and linked to a human working on behalf of a state. In the case of fully non-
predictable situations, there might be room for an argument that wrongfulness is precluded 
– e.g. on the basis of force majeure208.  
Third scenario is the hardest to conceptualize because if human is off the loop, the state 
agent is not in immediate connection with the autonomous system. This makes the nexus 
somewhat distant and complex. I would entertain three aspects that might all have some 
                                                     
204 MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29, at 16 
205 See e.g.  MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29, at 16. 
206 See chapter 2.1. 
207 E.g. in the context of: Article 28, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17th 
July 1998 and corrected by process-verbaux of 10th November 1998, 12th July 1999, 30th November 1999, 8th 
May 2000, 17th January 2001 and 16th January 2002, in force 1st July 2002. 
208 See chapters 2.3.3.4. 
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relevance in the present context. These are: sender/activator of the machine; structural level 
meaning the command structure; and owner and manufacturer of the AxS when it is a state 
actor.  
The role of activator of AxS has the closest link towards autonomous systems. There is a good 
reason to believe that activator, as the last human being in contact with the AxS, would fulfill 
the criteria laid out either in Article 4, 5 or 8 of ARSIWA depending on the nature of the 
particular situation. If one would accept that only sender or activator would constitute the 
state agent responsible for the AxS, then the acts of AxS would be acts of that particular 
state209. I will refer to the approach hereinafter as ‘the last human theory’.  
Yet, the other considerations need to be taken into account as well. In the context of the off-
the-loop systems the structural level, described above, needs to be evaluated separately. It 
is obvious that the analysis of structural level has relevance for the agent of state analysis. 
Pursuant ARSIWA, the conduct of a state organ can be: ‘exercises legislative, executive, 
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State’210. 
Therefore it is evident that the acts of command chain are the official acts. In the cases when 
the last human and command structure come from different states, there is a relevant 
allocation problem of attribution. The comprehensive analysis is rather impossible and very 
situation specific. However, ARSIWA will provide a couple of possibilities. There is possibility 
of joint author of responsibility211. In these cases both states would ‘own’ the action and, 
hence, the internationally wrongful act as well. Yet this is not the only possibility and the 
issue of joint action will be dealt in more detail way in chapter 2.3.5. Other possibility would 
be situation where the operator would have been put under the command structure of 
another state212. In these cases, the operator would not constitute an action of the sender 
state but she or he would be considered as an actor of the new state. In this type of situations 
the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts would automatically be linked to the new 
state. Therefore, it is actually more relevant to argue that structure level might rule over ‘the 
                                                     
209 Arts. 1-4, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
210 Art. 4, ARSIWA, supra note 8.   
211 Art. 47, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
212 Art 6 and commentaries (2-9), ARSIWA, supra note 8.  
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last human theory’. The exception to the rule is in cases of ultra vires action on the behalf of 
human actor213.  
The owning of an autonomous system is closely linked to the operator and structure level. In 
fact an owner of the system is the most probably at the very least complicit in the action – 
presuming that internationally wrongful act has happened. In those cases, the owner would 
be responsible either because of being the operator or because of the structure level reasons. 
Otherwise the system would have to be given away or taken from control. In the first case, 
the owner would be either former owner or lender of the machine. Selling situations have 
no specific provision in ARSIWA – when looking at the secondary norms of state 
responsibility. Similarly, if AxS would have been lent, it would be just a piece of technology – 
only regulated by the lending contract. The general rule of attribution would not be altered 
by this contract. The new user would be bound by its own obligations. Primary norms 
regulate the commerce; however, if these rules are followed state responsibility doctrine is 
not relevant for a seller or a lender of the machine. Stealing of an autonomous system might 
be problematic for the owner. However, if appropriate measures to protect the machine 
have been taken, the state would not be responsible for the action taken by the agent 
responsible for stealing. Yet, negligence might arise to the level of internationally wrongful 
act. These are still very much system specific primary norm obligations – not universally 
applicable to every AxS. Thusly, the role of owner does not bring anything new to the 
secondary norm side of state responsibility. Yet, the breach commercial contracts between 
states might initiate internationally wrongful act, however, the commerce of goods and 
services usually have lex specialis doctrines governing the area.  
To summarise there is a clear nexus between the establishment of a state agent and 
attribution of a given action to a state. This link is the core of state responsibility doctrine. In 
cases of wrongful acts, if they are committed by an actor that will form a state organ, the act 
is attributable to state and thus state is responsible for it. The next chapter consists the 
analysis of the reasons to preclude wrongfulness of an international wrongful act.    
                                                     
213 See chapter 2.3.4. 
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2.3.3 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness  
The ILC doctrine of state responsibility includes explicit circumstances that would preclude 
wrongfulness. In ARSIWA these provisions are stipulated in their own Articles including the 
norms and possible limitation to them214. The reasons to preclude wrongfulness was also 
introduced in the ILC’s work by Robert Ago – known as Ago revolution215. These articles have 
been part of the drafting process ever since and form a critical part of the doctrine. The 
doctrine includes also the article 27 which dictates the consequences of the invocation of 
these articles which include (a) obligation to follow a norm in question if reason to preclude 
it ends; and (b) ‘the question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in 
question’216. From these two the b is excluded from the analysis of the present thesis. 
Though, the compensations remain important, but very contested, part of the consequences 
of doctrine, and as such it is a topic of separate research. 
2.3.3.1 Consent  
Giving consent to an act of another state is a clear and candid way to preclude the 
wrongfulness of act. Thusly it is a reason to diminish responsibility for that particular act217. 
Consent is situation specific and its scope is totally dependent on the state that is giving it218. 
This is a basic international law principle219, and regardless it has not been explicitly referred 
by the ICJ220, the Court has referred to similar principle in for example Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo case221. To be precise, consent does not modify the primary norm 
as it is but it changes the applicability of primary norm in that given moment. The reason to 
                                                     
214 Arts. 20-26, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
215 Second report on State responsibility, supra note 160, at 192-195 and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Solidarity 
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220 Affef Ben Mansour, ‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on the State Responsibility: 
Consent’, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (Eds.) and Kate Parlett (Ass. Ed.) The Law of 
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preclude was debated during the drafting process of ARSIWA222 and through this debate 
contemporary view pointing towards secondary norm was come up with.  
Consent has to be valid in that it is given by the authority that has power to consent to the 
act of a foreign state in that particular situation223. Further, consent can only be given before 
an act or simultaneously when the act is taking place224 – acceptance given afterwards is 
called waiver225. It needs to be underlined that consent can be limited in terms of scope and 
time. Hence, the consent is neither open-ended nor unlimited.  
A state cannot consent on behalf of another state and thus in bilateral relationships consent 
has more relevance than in cases where many states are involved. For example in the context 
of multilateral treaty, consent of one state does not change the status of other states towards 
that norm226. Hence, the consent is more easily applicable in the context of bilateral 
obligations than multinational or universal ones. Also, there are some cases of wrongfulness 
that cannot be consented to. Certain human right norms or humanitarian law obligations 
cannot be consented to or waived. Still, individual’s voluntary consent can be taken into 
account in the application of certain rights as well.227 
In the AxS context the consent has real relevance. Especial attention has to be given to 
possibility of consent when using the systems in planned situations. Consent is for example 
useful in regular cross-border use of AxS. Since, the notion of consent is available only before 
and at the same time the breach is happening, in high tempo situations it might be difficult 
to give consent for that particular act. The possible future bilateral treaties regulating the use 
of AxS ought to include the range and limitations of possible consent – this would take care 
the tempo problem. To summarise the relevance of consent in the present context, it is clear 
that the consent is at the centre of international use of AxS.  
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224 Art. 20 and commentary (3), ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
225 Art. 45 commentaries (4-5), ARSIWA, supra note 8. See also: Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in 
Nauru (hereinafter Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case) (Nauru v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1992) 
240, at 246-247. 
226 Art. 20 and commentary (9), ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
227 Art. 20 and commentary (10), ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
44 
 
 
2.3.3.2 Self-defence  
The self-defence, being rather self-evident as a general concept, is a reason to preclude 
wrongfulness if it is in accordance with the United Nations Charter (UNC)228. Indeed, an act 
done in self-defence may justify the breach of norm that would normally constitute state’s 
responsibility229. Clearly, self-defence is crucial part of international law230.  
In the context of international law, the doctrine of self-defence is an old institution, applied 
in e.g. the Caroline incident231 and perhaps only crystalized in the UNC232. From the 
perspective of state responsibility there are two options to look at the issue: either you see 
self-defence as circumstance to preclude wrongfulness or simply as a right of a sovereign 
state233. The academic debate over the issue is concentrated on the question whether self-
defence is the long lasting tradition of law and self-prevention arising from law of nature234; 
or a norm related as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force235. The latter view 
                                                     
228 Art. 21, ARSIWA, supra note 8; Arts. 2(4) and 51, UNC; and see also Jean-Marc Thouvenin, ‘Circumstances 
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Pellet and Simon Olleson (Eds.) and Kate Parlett (Ass. Ed.) The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2010), 455-467 at 457. See also Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in Bruno Simma 
(Ed.) Hermann Mosler, Albrecht Randelzhofer, Christian Tomuschat and Rüdiger Wolfrum (collaboration) 
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Peace (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2008) at 126-129. 
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234 Hugo Grotius, supra note 130, at 397; see also Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: 
Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2013) at 11-17. 
235 Jean-Marc Thouvenin, ‘[...] Self-Defence’, supra note 227, at 456-459; see also e.g. Addendum - Eighth 
report on State responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the internationally wrongful act of the 
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seems to be held by the majority of scholars, and following their argument self-defence can 
exist only in legal systems that have prohibited the use of force in general sense236. Some 
hold the thought as well that self-defence could, quite unclearly, be both – a right and a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness237. Yet, from ontological (or epistemological) 
perspective and for the purpose of the present thesis, it is not feasible or beneficial to analyse 
matter further. From the AxS point of view, it is important to conclude that self-defence as 
such is related to the general prohibition of use of force – and has legal power as part of UN 
system.  
The doctrine of self-defence will not preclude all types of wrongfulness – for example some 
humanitarian law and human rights obligations cannot be precluded on this basis238. Hence, 
while acting in self-defence, the notions of the laws of armed conflict do apply in AxS context 
as well. Precluding wrongfulness is, additionally, applied vis-à-vis defending and attacking 
state but this nexus does not automatically change the status of third states239. It needs to 
be understood that in cases of self-defence there might be obligations towards third state. 
For example, it would not be in accordance with the doctrine to simply overrun third state 
because of the need for self-defence against the aggressor state.  
Substantively, the doctrine of self-defence is, at least originally, meant to apply in the 
situations of armed attacks240 governed by law of armed conflict (hereinafter LOAC). The 
court has argued that there appears to be: ‘general agreement on the nature of the acts 
which can be treated as constituting armed attacks’241. In this context, the court further 
found that not only the hostile, potentially lethal, acts constituted the sole part of armed 
attack but: ‘also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or 
other support.’242 Thusly, the court argued that the whole chain of command, including 
targeting and supporting components, are part of the apparatus committing armed attack.  
                                                     
236 Jean-Marc Thouvenin, ‘[...] Self-Defence’, supra note 227, at 457. 
237 Jean-Marc Thouvenin, ‘[...] Self-Defence’, supra note 227, at 459-461. 
238 Art. 21 and commentaries (3-4), ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
239 Art. 21 and commentary (5), ARSIWA, supra note 8; and Legality of Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 89, 
at 257. 
240 Art. 51, UNC, supra note 4. 
241 Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 16, at 103. 
242 Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 16, at 104; See also Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, 
Privatizing War, supra note 234, at 11-17. 
46 
 
 
Additionally, and regardless of the view of the Court explained above, there remains some 
vagueness and matters to discuss in the definition of the self-defence itself. For example in 
the UNC terms like attack or aggression are not explicitly specified even though they do 
appear in it for multiple times243. There is a General Assembly (hereinafter GA) resolution 
concerning the definition of aggression244 but as GA resolutions are not binding source of 
international law, it might lack legal power. Exactly, GA resolutions can only be counted as 
possible indications of customary law245. Additionally there is arguably difference between 
aggression and armed attack246. Hence, it is clear that not all aspects of self-defence can be 
addressed in the scope of present thesis.  
Given that the exact limits of the self-defence remain contested247, there is possibility for the 
misuse of the notion. It is clear that the abuse of self-defence would not preclude 
wrongfulness248. The two main ways to abuse the concept are either not to meet the 
conditions of its legal exercise or the scope of self-defence spreads further than it is 
allowed249. For the AxS developers, this means rather exact and precise demands related to 
use of force. Indeed, in order there to be a credible argument of legal self-defence, the act of 
self-defence has to be founded on response to armed attack or really imminent and credible 
threat of it250. Furthermore, when acting in self-defence AxS needs to follow at least the 
principles of necessity, proportionality and discrimination251. Thusly in order to preclude 
wrongfulness of act committed by AxS because of the excuse of self-defence the action taken 
cannot be too anticipatory, broad or untargeted.  
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The questions of preventive self-defence252 and whether the acts of individuals, namely e.g. 
terrorists, constitute armed attack are perhaps the most contemporary parts of the academic 
debate about the primary norms of self-defence. Yet in the present thesis, these aspects are 
not gone through more detailed way because of their magnitude and detailed analysis they 
require.  
Time limitation is implicitly embodied in the UNC Article 51 as well. Pursuant the article: until 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security253. It is very questionable what are sufficient enough measures to fulfil this 
requirement – especially if the imminent and acute situation continues regardless of the 
actions taken by Security Council (hereinafter SC)254. Obviously, the actions of the SC are 
inseparably linked to the realm of international relations and this is a good example of highly 
politicised law of self-defence. Nevertheless, this provision cannot be neglected in legal sense 
either – also paradoxically because of the politics of it. Additionally, as a time limitation, it is 
obvious that if the other conditions of self-defence are exhausted the legal reason of 
precluding wrongfulness on the basis of self-defence also ends. In the AxS context it means 
that even self-defence actions, however autonomous they may be, ought to be able to be 
overrun if condition for self-defence ends or if SC has exercised its powers of ‘maintaining 
peace and security’. The type of stopping mechanism is rather irrelevant – e.g it can be an 
electronic command or kinetic stopping technique.  Yet, it is evident that self-defence is not 
a carte blanche255 and thus in order to avoid the wrongfulness of the actions of AxS, the self-
defence measures have to be able to stop if circumstances change.  
Many of related questions are part of the evaluation of factual circumstances when engaging 
in an act of self-defence. Concerning autonomous systems it is clear that attack against 
autonomous systems might indicate aggression and thus justify self-defence measures. 
Additionally, autonomous systems can be the tool of self-defence as long as it follows the 
limits described above. It is therefore clear that as a reason to preclude wrongfulness self-
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defence is connected to autonomous systems very clearly. The self-reliant behaviour of 
machine is not changing the applicability of this notion in any way. Thus, for the developers 
of AxS the doctrine of self-defence means rather specific technical and operational 
requirements for very complex situations.  
2.3.3.3 Countermeasures  
As a reason to preclude wrongfulness, countermeasures have to be differentiated from self-
defence. The main difference is perhaps the amount of possible actions that can be taken – 
countermeasures include more possibilities for a state to act where self-defence is always 
related to the use of force256. It was through Robert Ago’s introduction of sanctions257 during 
the drafting process of ARSIWA, when countermeasures became reasons to preclude 
wrongfulness258. Countermeasures have two distinctive legal characteristics. Firstly, 
countermeasures, while still being a reason to preclude wrongfulness, pose a clear and 
willingly taken act against international obligation. Secondly, by the virtue of being a legal 
countermeasure it relieves the act of its illegal character. Hence the state in question is 
exonerated from the wrongfulness.259  
Because of these two legal characteristics, during the drafting process the issue of 
countermeasures was heavily debated. For example for countries like Mexico260 the notion 
was contrary to the international peaceful coexistence of states261. In the ICJ’s Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case the Court accepted the countermeasures, with some limiting 
conditions, as justifiable – e.g. pursuant the drafting reasoning done within the ILC process262.  
Thus, one is keen to believe that according to the contemporary interpretation the 
countermeasures can be a reason to preclude wrongfulness even in the context of AxS.  
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One needs to examine whether an act against AxS could trigger countermeasures. Answer to 
this would be yes since states tend to consider the protection of their property as a 
demonstration of their sovereignty263. Thusly, the notion of legal countermeasures can be 
used to protect autonomous systems. The second view is the analysis of the AxS usability as 
an instrument of legal countermeasure. This is, once again, very situation specific. At the 
general level, nothing prevents to use autonomous technologies to fulfil the 
countermeasures themselves. However, countermeasures refer to a long list of different 
actions. In all of those situations, proportionality has to be obviously followed. The evaluated 
question is that is such technology available that could perform the countermeasure in such 
a way that it stays within the limits of legal countermeasures.  
2.3.3.4 Force majeure  
Tracing back to Roman law, in formation of ad impossibilia nemo tenetur (trans. nobody is 
held to the impossible264), force majeure is a classic excuse to avoid responsibility in many 
domestic legal systems. Also in the international realm it has been recognised as a general 
principle of law. For example the ILC has recognised the principle already in the context of 
the law of treaties – as have all the signatories as well.265 In the drafting process of ARSIWA, 
the ILC took a view that the concept of force majeure is connected to term fortuitous266 – 
actually regardless of the opposite view from Special Rapporteur Ago267. Hence, the ILC’s 
formulation includes two parts. Firstly, force majeure can be invoked due to ‘occurrence of 
an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it 
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation’268. Additionally, 
pursuant the ARISIWA: ‘Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of force majeure is 
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due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; 
or (b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring’269. Following the formulation 
it has been held that the force majeure situation has to be irresistible, unpredictable and in 
some sense external270. These conditions were discussed in the commentaries of ARSIWA in 
a following way: 
‘Material impossibility of performance giving rise to force majeure 
may be due to a natural or physical event (e.g. stress of weather 
which may divert State aircraft into the territory of another State, 
earthquakes, floods or drought) or to human intervention (e.g. loss 
of control over a portion of the State’s territory as a result of an 
insurrection or devastation of an area by military operations carried 
out by a third State), or some combination of the two.’ 271 
The most notable exceptions, that perhaps cannot be used to meet the standards, are 
probably economic and political distress – regardless that these might have relevance in case 
of necessity272. That will be dealt in the upcoming sub-chapters. 
Due to mentioned conditions, the argument of force majeure is, as well, very much bound to 
the exact conditions of any particular incident. The main emphasis has to be material 
impossibility to foresee the event. Indeed, there ought to be nothing voluntary or even 
negligence in the creation of the circumstances.273 For the purpose of AxS incidents the 
threshold of force majeure argument is not met just by carelessness or mishandling the 
technical system it contains. Consequently, it is in many cases possible to argue that user 
should have foreseen the circumstances leading to the international wrongful act, and thus 
cannot invoke force majeure. This would also include many cases of malfunctioning – 
regardless of the accidental, unintended or undesired nature of the malfunctioning.274 It is 
however necessary to address the role of due diligence in both manufacturing (builder) and 
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testing (byer) stages, and its possible effect on the allocation of responsibility. The relevance 
for the analysis of testing is especially important for example in the context of autonomous 
weapons systems based on the Article 36 of Additional protocol I275. The due diligence is 
separately dealt later in the thesis.  
Regarding the situations of natural phenomena, force majeure is definitely possible 
argument even if it dismantles the operating pattern of the system. However, it is important 
that such event has to be irresistible and unforeseen. For example, not all natural 
phenomena are unforeseen. The operator state has to be ready for regular natural events – 
which makes the evaluation of appropriate circumstances very case specific. 
In the AxS context, the question of human intervention is rather interesting. AxS, as a system 
based on algorithm(s), is always vulnerable to the hacking and/or otherwise capturing the 
control of hardware part of the system. Such situations could in some circumstances amount 
to the force majeure from the perspective of the original user. For example, actions taken by 
AxS, which are caused by the hacker, could be considered as force majeure situation from 
the perspective of original user. In addition to possible force majeure, such situation might 
mean change in allocation of attribution. Also, an imminent threat of losing the control of the 
whole AxS, might amount to the situation of force majeure – allowing some actions that 
would otherwise be wrongful.276  
To conclude the issue of force majeure, the general argument is that it is hard to invoke in 
the AxS context. Especially ‘normal’ malfunctioning based internationally wrongful acts do 
not fulfil the criteria of force majeure. However, there are situations where it could be 
invoked. These situations are arising from similar issues as the ‘regular’ force majeure 
arguments – mainly natural events and uncontrolled human behaviour. 
2.3.3.5 Distress  
As a reason to preclude wrongfulness, distress can be conceptualised to be in between force 
majeure and necessity. Not surprisingly such proximity of other concepts has meant division 
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between legal scholars and general ambiguity concerning the concept.277 Somewhat peculiar 
line between on the one hand distress and on the other the force majeure and necessity is 
clarified in ARSIWA in a following way:  
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the 
act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, 
of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to 
the author’s care. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of distress is due, 
either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of 
the State invoking it; or (b) the act in question is likely to create a 
comparable or greater peril.278 
So, the distress differs from force majeure by the capability to preclude wrongfulness of acts 
that are in fact taken voluntarily, and because of the definition of distress concentrates to 
particular type of acts of individuals279. Additionally, pursuant the ARSIWA doctrine, distress 
seems to be more precise than the notion of necessity described in the next chapter. For 
distress argument, one needs particular a situation of threat to life of the author or others. 
Still, it would seem that the line between necessity and distress is harder to interpret than 
the one between distress and force majeure – especially because of the voluntary and active 
nature of action leading to the distress situation.280  
The particular character of the situation of distress might relate to the situations like entry 
into foreign airspace or seeking refuge in a foreign port without a permit281. Yet, it is still 
plausible that distress could be invoked in the other contexts as well. Already during the 
drafting process of ARSIWA it was suggested that:  
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…certain conventions have extended the applicability of this 
principle to somewhat different fields, and the ratio of the principle 
itself suggests that it is applicable, if only by analogy, to other 
comparable cases282.  
The ratio of the distress is important also in the context of AxS. Pursuant ARSIWA the threat 
to life seem to be a precondition for the invoking distress. Hence, mere threat to AxS itself, 
regardless of whether it includes the use of force or not, would not meet the threshold alone. 
However, if the possibility to lose AxS would include a threat towards human life, operator’s 
or someone else’s, it might preclude a wrongful act committed by AxS. Thusly, one can 
conclude that acting in distress might in some specific situations be a relevant legal reason 
for otherwise wrongful act of AxS. But, since AxS itself cannot be in mortal danger, AxS cannot 
be programmed to use distress as a reason for otherwise wrongful conduct.  
2.3.3.6 Necessity  
The necessity is one more reason to preclude wrongfulness pursuant ARSIWA283. According 
to article 25, a state, or several states, can invoke necessity when it is the only way, in cases 
when a state is facing grave and imminent peril284, and the act in question does not seriously 
impair the interests of other states or international community as a whole.285 Additionally, 
necessity may not be invoked if the obligation in question prohibits it or state invoking it has 
contributed to the situation286. Hence, necessity, or state of necessity as it has been called 
previously by the ILC, is as an abstract argument and a result of very subjective decisions 
which makes it even more complex doctrine of law. The purpose for it to exist is to provide a 
safeguard against too rigid application of law in situation with conflicting values.287 The 
notion has been argued, sometimes more successfully than others, in many different 
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contexts and cases like the Caroline incident288 of 1837, the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon 
situation of 1967289, Rainbow Warrior arbitration of 1990290 and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project case of 1997291. For these reasons, it has to be concluded that it is valid, yet, rather 
clearly defined circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
In the context of AxS, the evaluation of legal use of necessity argument remains very complex. 
It would be clear to say that the situation has to follow grave and imminent peril rule. 
Whether AxS could be a target of a grave and imminent peril depends on the nature of the 
system. It might very well be so that without otherwise internationally wrongful action, AxS 
would suffer, and thusly a state would suffer, such peril. Or that necessity would be used as 
an argument of anticipatory, or other, action taken by the AxS. Those cases would be highly 
specific and irregular but not imaginably impossible. Pursuant the cases mentioned 
previously, a possible framework for the argument of necessity might be for example the 
prevention of environmental damage. This being said, it is clear that the threshold for the 
necessity argument is very high. Also, even AxS action taken in the name of necessity cannot 
breach essential interests of other states or international community. Hence, the precaution 
and proportionality needs to be always taken into account. Further, if the situation has been 
caused by the AxS, it is clear that necessity cannot be used as an excuse for the future 
internationally wrongful behaviour. 
2.3.3.7 Compliance with peremptory norms  
Compliance with peremptory norm is based on the notion of jus cogens and norm hierarchy 
of international law292. In the context of dualistic nature of state responsibility, namely the 
primary and secondary norms, this particular reason to preclude wrongfulness is heavily 
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related to primary norms in question293. In the treaty law peremptory norm, or jus cogens, 
has been the most famously mentioned in the VCLT Article 53. Pursuant that treaty:  
‘peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character’294.  
The VCLT is highly considered to represent customary law due to its wide acceptance and 
special role in international law295. Indeed, jus cogens, or peremptory norms, can be seen to 
‘incorporate the fundamental values of the international community’296. Some examples of 
these might be prohibition of genocide, slavery, torture and crimes against humanity297. 
Regardless of these examples, it is clear that an exhaustive list of exact peremptory norms is, 
perhaps not even possible, but definitely not fruitful to go through for the purpose of the 
present thesis. It is sufficient to say that peremptory norms are exceptional in their 
importance and legal weight298. Thusly, in ARSIWA both the ambiguity and significance were 
incorporated in a following way: ‘Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any 
act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm 
of general international law.’ 299 
There are two particular aspects concerning the invoking of peremptory norms in the context 
of precluding wrongfulness. First one is the idea that these norms are a shielding against 
interest larger or more important than individual state interest. This means self-interest is 
not a reason to follow them. Secondly, states are always to follow them – also being under 
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coercive action of other states.300 It is thus to say peremptory norms prevail in situations even 
when there is lack of willingness or outside pressure to act otherwise. Yet, following norm 
hierarchy is full of political nuances which put the legal norm hierarchy in jeopardy. Despite 
the obvious challenges, in the present thesis these norms, even though not comprehensively 
defined, are taken as highest international law doctrine. 
In the context of autonomous systems the peremptory norms exist carrying the same 
importance as in other forms of social conduct of humans. Hence also in AxS context, no 
reason to preclude wrongfulness can be invoked if peremptory norms would be the ones 
breached. Indeed, there is no excuse to allow these norms to be breached by the 
autonomous systems since that would be forbidden for the humans as well. In other words, 
the importance of these norms ought to be highlighted as a pretext of the AxS context301.  
2.3.4 Question of ultra vires action 
The question of ultra vires acts is important part of the doctrine of state responsibility and as 
such it is something that needs to be addressed. Pursuant ARSIWA the issue is closely linked 
to state agent analysis. Indeed, this is demonstrated in two following examples:  
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity 
empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the 
organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its 
authority or contravenes instructions. 302 
and 
 It is irrelevant for this purpose that the person concerned may have 
had ulterior or improper motives or may be abusing public power. 
Where such a person acts in an apparently official capacity, or under 
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colour of authority, the actions in question will be attributable to the 
State. 303 
It is rather clear that even if unit controlling AxS would act ultra vires, the attribution of state 
responsibility would not change. A state has responsibility to return such unit under control 
and only failing to do so, after trying it in bona fide, might lift responsibility from the acts of 
those units304. Indeed, state’s responsibility for its own agents is strong.  
The matter of agent was discussed in chapter 2.3.2 and it the issue of ultra vires will be 
addressed on that basis. Following the definition of state agent, it is clear that AxS does not 
embody the legal capacity to act ultra vires as such. Operator, or his superior, does possess 
such capacity and should they act ultra vires, actions taken by them would be attributable to 
the state of origin. In those cases state is under an obligation to restore the agents under 
control – including the technologies they use. Also regardless of the fact that AxS might be 
able to learn, adapt and/or change their objective from the intended one, under 
contemporary international law the AxS itself cannot act ultra vires. Such event would simply 
constitute malfunctioning situation. Also, hacking or hi-jacking situations might change the 
control of an autonomous system to another agent and thus change or remove responsibility. 
However, that would not per se constitute ultra vires situation – given that hacking is coming 
from outside source.  
To summarise, it is clear that there need to be preparations made to counter ultra vires 
situations. Such contingency plans should include prepared protocols to return agents, and 
the AxS close to or operated by them, into the control of the state in question.  
2.3.5 Concerning multiple states and joint action  
The joint operations of states are elemental part of modern interaction between states. For 
the purposes of state responsibility, there are two categories of behaviour. Pursuant 
ARSIWA:  
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A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.305 
If the conditions above are met, then the responsibility can be invoked from two different 
perspectives. These are ‘circumstances where the internationally wrongful act is attributable 
to more than one state and where one State is implicated in the unlawful act of another 
State’306. Both of them are worth of separate discussion this context as well. The discussion 
here concentrates mainly on the secondary norms of state responsibility. 
Firstly, states can find themselves as co-authors of internationally wrongful act. It can happen 
through regular joint action, through a joint organ or by other means such as joint 
mandate.307 Joint action is a case where states act together in operation, for example military 
operations, either through-out the operation or in a way where different states contribute 
to different stages of a single action. It is crucial that, through the regular rules of attribution, 
the act committed by any state in that particular group contributes to internationally 
wrongful act attributable to all given that they are performing joint action in larger sense.308 
Action through a joint organ, which is not international organization per se, and especially 
not de jure, as such is attributable to each state that is a stakeholder in that particular joint 
organ309.  The joint mandate may also arise from links that common mandate creates e.g. if 
’the agent commits an unlawful act in the execution of its mandate, it will certainly incur the 
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responsibility for its act, but its principal will also incur responsibility for it’310. This would 
mean that even if an acting agent is one state but the mandate includes other states, the 
mandate might in some cases impose responsibility those states as well311.  
Secondly there is a possibility to include the action of state (A) as part of illegal actions of 
state (B) if the action of state (A) is supporting state (B) to commit the international wrongful 
act. The Court decided in the The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case:  
The Court sees no reason to make any distinction of substance 
between “complicity in genocide”, […] and the “aid or assistance” of 
a State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within 
the meaning of the aforementioned Article 16 […]. In other words, to 
ascertain whether the Respondent is responsible for “complicity in 
genocide” within the meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), which is 
what the Court now has to do, it must examine whether organs of 
the respondent State, or persons acting on its instructions or under 
its direction or effective control, furnished “aid or assistance” in the 
commission of the genocide in Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly 
different from that of those concepts in the general law of 
international responsibility.312 
The quotation above shows the possibility of such implicit responsibility based partly on the 
ARSIWA article – enhanced in that particular context by a treaty obligation as well. Hence, 
the aiding of other state313 and/or directing or controlling acts of other state314 might 
implicitly spread the responsibility – even if they have not committed the act themselves. For 
example interstate coercion can be the reason for the joint responsibility of states. Cases of 
coercion315, or relationship of dependence, might implicate either direct or indirect 
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responsibility of more powerful state.316 However, specific conditions have to be met and for 
example the representation of another state is not enough to establish relationship of 
domination. More evident demonstration of power over the other state is required.317 To 
understand the position of the coerced state, the situation might amount to level of force 
majeure. Hence, it needs to be concluded that if the conditions of article 16, mentioned 
previously, are met the assisting state is also responsible for the wrongful act but if the 
conditions of articles 17-18 and the sole responsibility remains with the controlling or 
coercing state. 
The responsibility for different breaches is also one branch of responsibility of multiple states. 
It is possible that ‘act of a State may in circumstances trigger the international responsibility 
of another State, based on an autonomous or distinct legal obligation’318. An example of this 
could be failing to mention harmful material, such as mines, to another state even in cases 
when the state has not planted those particular harmful materials and as such is not 
responsible for the primary breach of international norm319. Similarly, omission may also 
result in responsibility from the action of other actors if a primary norm dictates so. For 
example an attack towards diplomatic mission of state A by state B in the territory of state C, 
might result in situation where states B and C are responsible – B because of the attack and 
C because of the lack of protection320. 
The relevance of the mentioned state responsibility rules for the AxS are vast. The 
autonomous systems are very likely to be used in the cases of multiple state contexts. Thusly, 
all the aspects are relevant to analyse if there are many states involved. Especially it is 
important to realise a possibility of being co-author of the wrongful act and the possibility to 
be indirectly responsible if a state affects or assistants the action of the autonomous systems 
of other state. 
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2.3.6 Due diligence as part of state responsibility regime 
By its nature due diligence obligation is an obligation concerning conduct and not a result as 
such321. It is a method or classification of conduct that demonstrates the best effort and good 
faith of the actor in question when trying to obey an obligation or standard322. It is content- 
and context-specific in that the due diligence constitutes an applicable requirement only in 
some particular situations323. In the context of ARSIWA, due diligence is related to the 
primary norms that would constitute internationally wrongful act if not followed – e.g. by an 
omission of state324. It is rather clear that acting due diligently cannot be wrongful act itself 
but a failure to act due diligently might constitute such a situation that amounts to level of 
omission325. The ARSIWA commentaries do not take a stand on whether a breach, as it is 
formulated in the Article 2, is an objective or subjective breach of an obligation regarding the 
definition of omission. Both are possible – depending on the particular context and applicable 
obligations. To put it another way, the threshold for norm breach is formed in the context of 
the particular norm in question. The view is supported by, the ARSIWA commentaries which 
do conceptualise due diligence obligation as a context specific requirement – not as a 
standard that is always applicable.326 It is for these reasons that only rather abstract analysis 
on general rules of due diligence can be done.  
Despite the lack of preciseness, it is fairly clear that the question of due diligence is part of 
the legal discourse of AxS as well. From the perspective of state responsibility doctrine, three 
different aspects of due diligence will be discussed in this thesis.  These are due diligence 
responsibility in the context of operating the system; due diligence when a state is either 
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building or buying (testing) autonomous systems; and thirdly due diligence in the framework 
of behaviour of citizens. The last of these concentrates on failure to prevent certain actions 
that would constitute state responsibility as well327. All these three aspects are analysed 
separately.  
For the purposes of the present thesis, state responsibility and the notion of liability are both 
relevant in this framework. However, the main emphasis in this thesis remains at the core of 
state responsibility articles of the ILC. Thusly, due diligence obligations ought to be seen as a 
particular part of the wider notion of responsibility.328 
2.3.6.1 Due diligence responsibility in the context of operating autonomous systems 
Due diligence responsibility in the context of operating autonomous systems refers especially 
to the standards that the operating action of state has to meet. As explained in the 
previously, due diligence analysis is related to specific situation and primary norms in 
question. For this reason, the idea in this chapter is to provide the reader understanding 
about the general due diligence requirements of the operator. The due diligence analogies 
that will be introduced next are related to the thresholds of transboundary harm together 
with the principle of prevention and the use of force. By using these two analogies, the aim 
is to show two different areas of law where due diligence obligations influence the allocation 
and limits of responsibility – especially in the autonomous systems context.  
The first analogy is taken from the international environmental law. To be precise it is the 
obligation not to cause damage to the environment of other states329. Arguably the analogy 
could be used at the least in the context of transboundary harm that has taken place when 
using autonomous systems.330 Still, one needs to remember that it might be problematic to 
apply the analogy to other context even if the analogy seemed logical – and this limitation 
has been taken into account. In cases of harmful activity, this particular analogy provides 
different categories for the accepted harmful activity. These categories are especially 
relevant in situation where the action in general terms is not prohibited by international law. 
                                                     
327 To see the context e.g. Tal Becker, ‘Terrorism and the State’, supra note 129, at 141-146. 
328 See e.g. Robert P. Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law’, supra note 150, at 9. 
329 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003) at 235-249. 
330 Art. 1, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note, 109. 
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In the ARSIWA framework, the evaluation of harm would be relevant only in the context of a 
norm breach. To put it another way, from liability perspective, the evaluation of accepted 
harm takes place regardless of norm breaches.  
Concerning the due diligence needed, the ILC argued, very likely reflecting customary law: 
 “risk of causing significant transboundary harm” includes risks taking 
the form of a high probability of causing significant transboundary 
harm and a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary 
harm331 
The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk 
thereof.332 
Any decision in respect of the authorization of an activity within the 
scope of the present articles shall, in particular, be based on an 
assessment of the possible transboundary harm caused by that 
activity, including any environmental impact assessment.333 
These articles describe the limits of the acceptable level of risk – even if the action itself is 
legal. In those situations, the evaluation is based on the combination of risk334 as a concept 
of probability and harm as a term of severity for potential damage. This nexus is further 
explained by the ILC: 
“risk of causing significant transboundary harm” refers to the 
combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an accident and 
the magnitude of its injurious impact. It is, therefore, the combined 
effect of “risk” and “harm” which sets the threshold […] A definition 
based on the combined effect of “risk” and “harm” is more 
                                                     
331 Art. 2(a) and commentary (1-3), Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
332 Art. 3, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
333 Art. 7, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
334 More on risk analysis see e.g. Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics’, translated by Leevi Lehto (‘Politiikan 
uudelleen keksiminen’) (Translated by Leevi Lehto) In Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive 
Modernisation. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetic in the Modern Social Order (trans. Nykyajan jäljillä: 
refleksiivinen modernisaatio). (Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy: Jyväskylä, 1996) at 1-27.  
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appropriate for these articles, and the combined effect should reach 
a level that is deemed significant. The obligations of prevention 
imposed on States are thus not only reasonable but also sufficiently 
limited so as not to impose such obligations in respect of virtually any 
activity.335 
This nexus of categories provides the threshold and limits for the action that can take place 
in otherwise legal activity. Vice versa this means that the spectrum of allowed activity can be 
described as well. Hence, the definition of allowed activity would not include small risks of 
ultrahazardous or a high probability of significant harm. Yet, allowed would be low 
probability of even significant transboundary harm.336 
The works of the ILC provide a framework for legal transboundary harm analysis, given that 
the harm is physical and based on otherwise legal activity337. Yet, the evaluation of ‘serious 
consequences’ has been applied for a long time. It was invoked already in the Trail Smelter 
arbitration338 and thus it has a long history in international law339. Together with similar 
principles, like the precautionary principle340, the principle of prevention is at the core of due 
diligence obligation. Yet, the style, degree and scope of required preventive measures remain 
obviously context specific341. It is worth underlining that the duty in these articles on 
prevention of transboundary harm is explicitly based on the environmental law obligation342. 
Hence, there is good reason to believe that similar due diligence obligation exists in the 
context of AxS – in the context of environmental law. But, the actual articles also explicitly 
refer to the ‘physical’ transboundary harm343. Hence, if there is no other legal doctrine (as 
lex specialis) to apply, there is a good reason to argue that the concept and thresholds of 
physical transboundary harm would be applicable in other contexts of law as well. Also, there 
                                                     
335 Art. 2 commentary (2), Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109.  
336 Art. 2 commentary (3), Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
337 Art. 1, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
338 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States, Canada) 3 RIAA (1941) 1905-1982 at 1965. 
339 E.g. Case Concerning Pulp Mills On The River Uruguay (hereinafter Pulp Mills case) (Argentina v. 
Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports (2010) 14. 
340 See e.g. Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 329, at 246-249. 
341 Art. 3, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
342 Art. 3 commentary (8), Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
343 Art. 3 commentaries (8-11), Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 109. 
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is no specific reason why this would not be the case in relation to the autonomous systems 
as well. To summarise, the prevention principle and different degrees related to it, are 
relevant in the AxS context as well. The analysis should concentrate on whether situation 
would amount at the level of significant, or ultrahazardous, activity. This is crucial for the 
liability issues of autonomous systems.  
The second analogy is drawn from the primary norms of the use of force. Following the 
context of present thesis, the use of force analogy is done in the framework of state 
responsibility doctrine. In fact, the use of force, as a conduct, is rarely a pure liability issue 
given that there are so many primary norms regulating the doctrine. Both conventions344 and 
customary law345 cover this area of law extensively. It is also clear that in this context there 
are different standards that have to be met, which differ between the norms in question346. 
For example humanitarian law, and human rights law for that matter, do create tighter 
obligations, than due diligence obligations, to follow347. Additionally, for example LOAC 
provides principles that have to be evaluated in the context where they are used – very 
similar to due diligence conduct348. The change of context would change the level of due 
diligence needed – for example being under aggression might change due diligence required. 
Also, in situations when there is a suspicion that proportionality principle in the context of 
self-defence has been violated, it has to be analysed whether necessary measures had been 
taken to avoid the wrongful act. The same logic is applicable to the act of omission as well. 
All of these aspects are applicable to autonomous systems context as well. 
Also, there are due diligence analyses within the reasons to preclude wrongfulness. Arguably, 
these are very much connected to primary norms as well. For example due diligence in the 
context of proportionality of self-defence is substantively different from due diligence in the 
context of necessity. Also, in the context of force majeure acting in a due diligent manner 
                                                     
344  E.g. Additional protocol I, supra note 86. 
345 See e.g. self-defense in chapter 2.3.3.2. 
346 See e.g. Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War, supra note 234, at 230-273. 
347 MCDC, ‘Legal analysis’, supra note 29, 14-18. See also e.g. ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law Similarities and differences’, 1/2003, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf, Last checked 11.01.2015. 
348 See e.g. chapter 2.3.3.2. 
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might mean that it goes against “irresistible force or of an unforeseen event” -rule349. Can an 
event be unforeseen if it is already (and due diligently) addressed? This question is almost 
totally case specific but in most cases the answer would seem to be not. Also, the real life use 
of AxS is related to issues like best practices – as implicitly referred by the ICJ350. 
To conclude the usage of AxS sub-chapter of the due diligence obligations, one has to 
underline the uniqueness of primary norm situations. The usage of the autonomous systems 
will be subjected to this analysis. Due diligence analysis is relevant in both state responsibility 
and liability situations of using autonomous systems – however the premise of the analysis 
is different. Actually, the usage of AxS is often related to the due diligence obligation – given 
that there are also more precise and absolute obligations related to using them. Therefore, 
due diligence analysis will be taken into account in the scenario analysis chapters as well. 
2.3.6.2 Due diligence regarding either building and testing or buying and testing 
autonomous systems 
From the perspective of building and testing autonomous systems it is crucial to analyse the 
type of standards that are in place, related to the type of the autonomous system in question. 
Basically, the question is whether there is a legal obligation to vigorously test the legality of 
a system – or is legality presumed through more general features of apparatus. Following, 
the standard of testing would constitute state responsibility issue, if a state fails to comply 
with specific requirements regarding building or testing of an autonomous system. If there is 
no separate regime regarding that particular type of machines, then builder, buyer (tester) is 
normally responsible or liable for ultimately using the AxS – regardless of the whether they 
have built it by themselves or bought it from someone else.  
Therefore, the clearest examples related to the responsibility of building and testing or 
buying and testing situations are arising in situations when there exists an explicit reason to 
do so. The question is therefore primary norm specific and impossible to go through 
exhaustively for whole autonomous systems discourse. However, as an example, there is a 
                                                     
349 Art 23, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
350 Pulp Mills case, supra note 339, at 77-79. 
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specific primary norm in place concerning the testing of new weapon systems. It can be found 
from widely ratified351 Additional Protocol I:  
NEW WEAPONS. In the study, development, acquisition or adoption 
of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting 
Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol 
or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party.352 
The provision is a good example of particular primary norm that imposes certain level of 
standards for treaty parties. The effect of the Article 36 is on the one hand explicit but on the 
other hand it could be described to represent the object and purpose of the treaty – specified 
in the VCLT353. Thusly, it is clear that contracting parties have a clear reason to obey it in a 
good faith. Yet, it is not unproblematic to interpret the treaty this way and for example in the 
context of the ILC jurists could not fully agree on the weight of different treaty 
interpretations354. Especially in the context of Article 36 it is hard to interpret when the 
‘determination’ of legality is fully followed – it is practically impossible to foresee all possible 
scenarios of applicability and malfunctioning situations. So, even there it has to be a 
threshold of good practices and due diligence that is enough. Hence, the question of the 
limits of treaty obligation is indeed intriguing and very case specific. As a general rule, a state 
needs to consider whether the field of autonomous system is such that there are obligations 
regarding the harmfulness the system. If so, there is a good reason to believe that building 
or buying a system is subjected to the principle of not going against the object and purpose 
interpretation355. It is safer to be aware of treaty obligations and to take them, as vigorously 
as it is possible, into account the building and buying phases of the system. 
                                                     
351 The protocol has 174 ratifications, see: ICRC, ‘Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties’, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=D9E6B6264D7723
C3C12563CD002D6CE4, Last checked 19.01.2015. 
352 Art. 36, Additional Protocol I, supra note 86.  
353 Arts 18-19 and 31, VCLT, supra note 69. 
354 Art. 27-28th and commentary 2, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries (1966), (ILC 
Yearbook, 1966, vol. II). 
355 Arts 31, VCLT, supra note 69. 
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A situation where there is no prohibited action as such, requires liability analysis. This is also 
relevant in building or testing context as well. These are usage specific questions in the 
framework of manufacturing and using (or deployment) of the system. For example, if 
physical harm takes place, the question of the precautionary principle is then to be 
discussed356. Indeed, precautionary principle is a clear demonstration of such due diligence 
threshold in the testing context as well. Since the principle has been applied in different 
contexts, it is quite clear that there are different interpretations of it. The common elements 
of precautionary principle(s) are the following: in international context it always refers to 
transboundary situations; there is a scientific uncertainty at least to a certain degree; 
uncertainty does not mean automatic blocking of technology but only applying best practices 
when utilizing the technology; a certain level of potential risk of damage is required; balance 
of cost regarding precautionary measures and cost of doing nothing have to be evaluated; 
and the principle may entail shifting the burden of proof to one who is starting the activity357. 
Following these definitions, the applicability of the principle is unquestionable when it comes 
to explicit treaty obligations. Whether there exists a customary law principle of precaution 
remains contested. Some are arguing that such regime is in place due to the usage of the 
term in various international regimes. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has 
applied the principle both as treaty obligation and as principle in international law.358 Yet, 
many seem to challenge the idea based on the ambiguity of the term; disunited and 
heterogeneous state practice; and lack of e.g. ICJ case law accepting the principle as part of 
customary law359. Consequently, the precautionary principle has relevance in analysis of 
state responsibility of autonomous systems. However, only through context specific analysis 
the actual legal weight of the doctrine can be analysed. It is clear that precaution has to be 
differentiated from the more solid principle of prevention – difference being harm that the 
                                                     
356 Gerhard Hafner and Isabelle Buffard, ‘Obligations of Prevention and Precautionary Principle’, in James 
Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (Eds.) and Kate Parlett (Ass. Ed.) The Law of International 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 522-534 at 526. 
357 Gerhard Hafner and Isabelle Buffard, ‘[…] Prevention and Precautionary Principle’, supra note 356, at 528-
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358 Gerhard Hafner and Isabelle Buffard, ‘[…] Prevention and Precautionary Principle’, supra note 356, at 530-
532. Also: Tătar v. Romania, no. 67021/01, ECHR Judgment (27th January 2009) at paras. 73 and 120. 
359 Gerhard Hafner and Isabelle Buffard, ‘[…] Prevention and Precautionary Principle’, supra note 356, at 530-
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prevention principle is preventing is more probable than the scientific risk behind the 
principle of precaution. The more probable the risk, the clearer it is that it needs to be due 
diligently dealt.  
It is rather clear that the due diligence obligation cannot be used to discriminate other sellers 
of systems. There are two main rules in international law concerning the treatment of 
foreigners – or foreign companies. The western idea is that there ought to be minimum 
standards that every nation ought to respect360. The other option is the national treatment 
standard held mainly by South American countries361. This theory would require foreign 
companies to be held in the same standard as national companies362. The general rule is then 
amended by restrictions – e.g. generally speaking national security questions give the right 
to discriminate while making purchases. This is evident for example in the EU law context.363 
These aspects need to be taken into account when acquiring AxS systems for official 
purposes. If a system is purchased from an EU country in the context of civilian use, and 
without any other legal reason to discriminate the seller, the origin of the supplier ought not 
to be part of evaluation as such. Regarding the most contemporary development, the 
negotiations concerning The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)364 might 
additionally affect the sale of autonomous systems. However, given secrecy concerning the 
negotiations the issue cannot be evaluated as such. In the context of due diligence the fact 
that a company is foreign cannot as such result in different treatment. However, if AxS are 
bought for national security purposes there is a legal room for a different type of scrutiny. In 
this sense autonomous systems do not seem to have technology specific characters. 
 
                                                     
360 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, at 824; and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, supra note 20, at 525. 
361 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, 824-825; and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, supra note 20, at 524. 
362 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, supra note 13, 824-827. See also e.g. United Nations Conference On 
Trade And Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) National Treatment, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. IV, United 
Nations: New York, 1999) 1-84. 
363 Arts. 34-37, Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU), Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47, 13th of December, in force 1st of December. 
364 See e.g. European Commission, ‘Trade: In focus: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – 
Making trade work for you’, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/, Last checked 11.01.2015. 
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Regarding general analysis, the state responsibility doctrine relates to the process and the 
best practices required from the builder or from the buyer when testing the autonomous 
system. Due diligence is a method that represents primary norm obligation. In cases like 
weapon systems, where there is a ban of developing some particular features pursuant the 
Article 36365, there are no excuses if the testing part of the process does not meet the most 
relevant standards. In this situation negligence in testing would constitute an internationally 
wrongful act. In cases where there is no such provision general answer cannot be given. The 
question can be answered only case specifically.  
2.3.6.3 Behaviour of private individuals in state responsibility doctrine and in 
the context of due diligence 
Pursuant the main rules a state should not be held responsible for the actions of private 
individuals. This rule also includes individuals who though possessing the status of state 
agent, do not act in that capacity at the time of action – yet acting ultra vires does not 
constitute such private action. However, it is clear that the distinction between official and 
unofficial capacities must be made in the context of action. General doctrine concerning the 
acts of individuals has been the acknowledged by scholars and is arguably the position of 
contemporary state responsibility system.366 Yet, there are two types of situations when the 
actions of individuals become an issue of state responsibility. The first category is formed of 
the situations that might seem, a priori, to be attributable to individuals but end up to 
become state activity. The second category comprises from situations where state 
responsibility is based on the catalytic action of an individual. In the latter category, the act 
of an individual is not the basis for state responsibility as such but the state responsibility 
arises from a separate wrongful act of state.367 Following the ILC’s formulation, it is relevant 
to understand that:  
                                                     
365 Additional Protocol I, supra note 86,  
366 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Attribution of Conduct to the State: Private Individuals’, in James Crawford, Alain 
Pellet and Simon Olleson (Eds.) and Kate Parlett (Ass. Ed.) The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2010), 257-280 at 257-264. See also: Art. 4 and commentaries 1-13 and Arts. 7-8, 
ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
367 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Attribution [...] Private Individuals’, supra note 365, at 257-261. See also Art 4 and 
commentary 2, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
71 
 
 
The attribution of conduct to the State as a subject of international 
law is based on criteria determined by international law and not on 
the mere recognition of a link of factual causality. As a normative 
operation, attribution must be clearly distinguished from the 
characterization of conduct as internationally wrongful.368 
Pursuant the formulation, the attribution to a state has to be based on an international law 
norm – not seeming logical causality of events. Thusly, from the perspective of state 
responsibility doctrine, the question of state responsibility and actions of individuals has to 
be understood as secondary norms. Yet, when examining the catalytic side of the behaviour 
of individuals, the notion does not exclude possibility that there are primary norms making 
actions of individuals as an issue of state’s responsibility. This is arguably different than main 
doctrine of state responsibility, and very much an issue of due diligence as well. Hence, it is 
justified to analyse the issue in the present chapter.  
The first category of a priori attribution is based on articles 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 of ARSIWA369. 
Typical for the reasons mentioned in the articles are either by the type of recognition by a 
state370 or de facto (or fonctionnaire de fait) control of actions of individuals371. Regarding 
the de facto option, it is clear that the exact interpretation is complex. At the very least two 
interpretations of the threshold of attribution: one view argues for the complete dependence 
of private actors (on state) and the other effective control of state over the private actors.372 
There is no attempt to solve this ambiguity in the present thesis but it is sufficient that both 
views are noticed at this point. The use of public power in the absence of default state 
authority is based on three, rather equivocal, criterions that have to be met in order for the 
attribution to exist:  
first, the conduct must effectively relate to the exercise of elements 
of the governmental authority, secondly, the conduct must have 
                                                     
368 Chapter II commentary 4, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
369 ARSIWA, supra note 8. See also: Olivier de Frouville, ‘Attribution [...] Private Individuals’, supra note 365, 
at 264-275. 
370 Arts. 6 and 11, ARSIWA, supra note 8. 
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been carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities, 
and thirdly, the circumstances must have been such as to call for the 
exercise of those elements of authority.373 
Hence, even the lack of default state authority does not mean that actions might not be 
attributable to any state. Following, in the cases of articles 8 and 9 the attribution to the state 
arises from the certain facts regarding the situation – not the legal institutional link. In other 
words, the action committed by the individuals constitutes action that is attributable to the 
state on the factual level of action not on an institutional level.374 Regarding a posteriori 
endorsement of an act, mentioned previously, it is possible to link acts committed by 
individuals to state, if ‘…State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its 
own’375. The rule remains complex both in sense of act and omission. If an action is explicitly 
considered by a state as its own, there is a question whether the rule would apply. Yet, one 
may imagine a situation where: firstly, a wrongful action itself would not be conducted by a 
state but by private individuals (de facto and de jure); secondly, the state would bear primary 
norm responsibility to try to end the breach; and thirdly, the state still would endorse the 
act. This type of situation might be attributable since endorsement would reflect larger 
tolerance and a deeper connection towards the act – especially from the omission 
perspective.376 The ICJ supported this type of view in its judgment as well377. Hence, it ought 
to be concluded that the endorsement of actions of civilians might build the legal threshold 
for wrongful act. 
From the autonomous systems perspective, the actions of individuals can easily become 
state activity as well. This is most evident in a situation when a state explicitly acknowledges 
individuals using, or otherwise acting together with AxS, as state action. In these situations, 
states will probably be quite diligent regarding the actions they are willing to consider as their 
own – in order to avoid the possibility for internationally wrongful acts. Secondly, 
unacknowledged actions of individuals might become relevant to states in the AxS context 
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376 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Attribution [...] Private Individuals’, supra note 365, at 273-275. 
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as well. In these cases, the action that individuals commit themselves through AxS become 
such that states, by implicitly endorsing it, invoke state responsibility doctrine. These 
situations could easily be imagined in the autonomous systems context. But, similarly, there 
is an assumption that states will rather carefully evaluate whether to give such implicit 
endorsement to actions – this is a highly political decision which still might have international 
law consequences. 
The second category of links between the state responsibility and action of individuals is the 
catalysis aspect. It is based on the different logic than previously discussed categories. The 
idea of catalysis responsibility is derived from the notion of complicit responsibility of a state 
for the actions of private individuals. For these reasons, the idea of catalysis is criticized since 
complicit theory implies the rejection of a dualistic model of law – where individuals are 
bound by domestic laws and states by international law. On the surface this claim seems 
reasonable. Still, some factors have made the catalysis argument a relevant part of state 
responsibility regime as well.378 
Indeed, there are a couple of problems in renouncing the catalysis effect. For example the 
contemporary international law encompasses norms which invoke obligations both to state 
and individual. In these situations it is reasonable to see an apparent nexus between state 
responsibility and acts of individuals. A state does not make itself an accomplice to the action 
of individual but the action of individual makes the matter a state obligation issue.379 Indeed, 
the obligation of controlling individuals is related, in a due diligence manner, to the effective 
control of state over its territory380. The threshold for it is rather important. The control of 
state’s territory does not have to be absolute but as the ICJ put in the Corfu Channel case:  
But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control 
exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State 
necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act 
perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have 
                                                     
378 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Attribution [...] Private Individuals’, supra note 365, at 275-277. 
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Application Of The Convention On The Prevention and Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, supra note 306, 
at 176-178. 
380 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War, supra note 234, at 226-228. 
74 
 
 
known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other 
circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts 
the burden of proof381. 
Hence, it is clear that states do not have to monitor everything. The threshold seems to be 
that a state has to take all reasonably expected measures to avoid the situation. This 
obligation is very much primary norm specific and consequently state responsibility for the 
acts of individuals is not automatically invoked – even when there is lack of effort on behalf 
of a state. For example the treaty obligation arising from the 1907 Hague convention explains 
threshold for due diligence action in one particular context:382 
 Art. 4. Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies 
opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents. 
[…] Art. 6. The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the 
fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services 
to one of the belligerents.383 
In the quotations above, the level of due diligence that is required from a treaty party is 
limited to stop recruiting agencies – not to stop individuals from leaving. This is a good 
illustration of type of behaviour that has to be analysed in every situation separately. In the 
context of autonomous systems it is very much domain and system specific what type of 
norms are related to using of AxS by individuals. What is clear, though, is that this obligation 
is there because of the obligations based on the primary norms. In the drafting process of 
ARSIWA catalysis idea was rejected from the state responsibility articles themselves and the 
catalysis that we have nowadays is legal regime specific.384 
Still, the argument based on the catalysis effect remains ambiguous for autonomous systems 
context. There is a possibility to invoke this argument. However, it has to be done context 
specifically. For example autonomous weapon systems are weapon systems as any other, 
and actions of individuals will constitute international, and possibly internationally wrongful 
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acts, of states if primary norms so govern. As a concrete example, states would probably bear 
responsibility for the acts of individuals if they are sending autonomous weapon systems 
(with their operators) to other countries. If such recruiting office exists, the state would 
probably bear responsibility to interfere to the recruiting or it would commit an 
internationally wrongful act. Hence, individuals can act as catalysis for state responsibility. 
However, these situations are similar to other contexts of social life. The new aspects that 
autonomous systems are creating are thus rather few.  
2.3.7 Acts not prohibited by international law in the context of state 
responsibility  
In addition to state responsibility regime there is a notion of liability in the situations of acts 
not prohibited by international law. There is some ambiguity concerning the term since the 
phenomenon called liability in English is in some other UN languages the same as for the 
word responsibility – e.g. responsabilité and responsabilidad385. In legal Finnish language the 
words have similarities though are different – responsibility is syyntakeisuus or 
vastuunalaisuus and liability is tuottamusvastuu386. But as evident, in English the distinction 
between the terms has been made explicitly. Perhaps there is a good reason to make this 
distinction since pursuant ARSIWA in the absence of internationally wrongful act state 
responsibility cannot be invoked, however, a state might be liable for some harm done 
without a breach of specific obligation387. The notion has been called by many names but 
they all include the core idea of liability without internationally wrongful act as such. For the 
purpose of this thesis, this phenomenon is called objective liability and it is used as a 
supplementary set of rules towards state responsibility doctrine.388  
It needs to be underlined that there is persuasive argument implying that the regime of 
objective liability is not fully established as applicable international law regime. It might be 
accepted as a concept on the domestic legislation level but contemporary it lacks the full 
applicability of international legal regime. It has been argued that these rules have some 
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characteristics of recommendation (or soft law), however it is definitely not totally 
negligible.389 Problematic issues include for example: the influence and relationship towards 
responsibility regime as a separate regime of law; differing and incomparable state practise; 
rise of specific legal regimes prohibiting certain hazardous activities; and the incoherent 
scope of applicability of the doctrine390. Taking into account these substantial challenges in 
the legal applicability of objective liability, there still remain good reasons to go through some 
specifics of the notion.  
In the context of present thesis, the doctrine of objective liability is a supplement to the state 
responsibility doctrine. There is a reason to identify intersections between state 
responsibility and objective liability, and further to explore the role of due diligence within 
that nexus. So, the thesis concentrates on the doctrine of state responsibility, yet, objective 
liability will be used as a tool to frame the limits of the state responsibility doctrine.  
The purpose of the objective liability is to provide a mechanism of compensation for 
situations where victims have suffered from action that is not prohibited. It is therefore 
damage or injury that is crucial in the context of liability391. This is contrary to the premise of 
the ILC state responsibility doctrine where the crucial factor is internationally wrongful act – 
not necessarily damage as such392. Yet, in both contexts the remedy and compensation are 
crucial for the real life impacts of the doctrines. In the present thesis, the allocation of such 
remedies has been excluded. The ILC formulated the core of liability in a following way:  
Contrary to State responsibility, international liability rules were 
primary rules, for they established an obligation and came into play 
not when the obligation had been violated, but when the condition 
that triggered that same obligation had arisen. […] Under the present 
topic, on the other hand, the harmful event, while perhaps being a 
foreseeable event, did not constitute a breach of an obligation. […] 
                                                     
389 Michel Montjoie, ‘The Concept of liability [...]’, supra note 324, at 512. See also ILC, ‘International liability 
in case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities’, 
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391 Michel Montjoie, ‘The Concept of liability [...]’, supra note 324, at 505-508. 
392 See chapters 2.2.2. and 2.2.3. Also: e.g. Report of the International Law Commission on the work 
of its thirty-ninth session, (A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1, ILC Yearbook 1987, vol. II[2]), 1-62 at 43.  
77 
 
 
In the view of these members, however, under the regime of the 
present topic the State liable would have to compensate as a general 
rule. […] The rules of attribution were also different under the two 
topics. In the case of liability without a wrongful act, the place where 
the activity was carried on determined the State that was in principle 
liable. In the case of responsibility for a wrongful act, that criterion 
was, on the contrary, inadequate.393 
Following the reasoning of majority of the ILC members, the liability is a separate legal notion 
from state responsibility. The objective liability seems to be related only to physical harm – 
not for example commercial or financial one394. Accordingly, within physical harm there are 
types of activities that might lead to objective liability. These activities have to be evaluated 
through the risk based evaluation of accidents (hazardous) and collateral effects (harmful 
activities) – especially in the environmental law context. The first one is related to the 
consequence that is both unintended and to certain extend unanticipated – at the very least 
the aim of the activity has not been this outcome395. The unwanted effects are based on the 
concept of gradual harm where the threshold of liability is rather ambiguous396. The best 
clarification seems to be the concept of significant harm397 that then shapes the threshold 
for acceptable conduct – more significant harm is probable to take place, more due 
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diligence398 is required to prevent it. From point of view of these effects, the principle of 
prevention and due diligence are crucial.  
The objective liability is differently attributable to state than state responsibility doctrine. The 
later required a person or entity that forms the attribution399. In the context of liability, 
however, the condition for attribution is based on territorial jurisdiction of that particular 
area where harmful action is taking place. Although if one loses territorial jurisdiction but 
remains to occupy it, state responsibility and liability responsibilities remain accompanied 
with the physical control of a territory400. The problem is that action within jurisdiction 
controlled by states is in many times taken by individuals and other non-governmental 
actors. This part of the question remains very controversial, and for example it seems to be 
unanswered “whether one could attribute to the State an activity liable to cause technological 
or industrial harms simply because these harms would be catastrophic?”401 So, it is clear that 
the weaknesses of liability regime remain relevant in the context of attribution as well. 
Indeed, attribution seems to be rather context specific issue in that some actions are rising 
to (state) responsibility level and some remain for the liability of the operator level.  
The principle of prevention has relevance from the perspective of liability, however, the ILC 
treats these as separate entities402. The principle of prevention has been developed in the 
context of environmental law but it arguably has customary relevance in other sectors of law 
as well403.  It is a legal principle that has significance both in the context of state responsibility 
and liability – thought the meaning differs between the two. The main difference is related 
to the breach of an obligation. In cases when the prevention principle is an international 
norm and has not been followed, the breach of obligation means that the issue falls under 
the doctrine of state responsibility. The wrongfulness of not following preventive principle 
changes the applicable doctrine of law. In those cases prevention principle is part of the 
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399 See chapter 2.3.2. 
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normal customary law. The treaty regime does not, however, fully contribute the liability 
regime since liability might arise from non-prohibited action and it also includes the notion 
of reparation – to which many treaties stay silent. Thus, in those cases the principle of 
prevention is even more ambiguous. 404  
There is some ambiguity whether the obligation of prevention is primary or secondary norm 
since on the one hand it is an obligation regulating the result and on the other hand obligates 
to the certain positive action of prevention405. In the context of state responsibility the 
prevention principle seems to have secondary norm qualities406 – for example in the Article 
14(3)407. This is very a due diligence obligation408.  
In the framework of liability, the principle of prevention is very much an issue of primary 
norms the setting conditions of conduct. In these cases a breach of obligation of conduct may 
take place without material damage to the surrounding world – this is particularly so in the 
case of environmental law.409 In other words, it is possible to breach the principle of 
prevention without causing for example environmental damage as such. The major problem 
with the principle of prevention in this context is that perhaps the most relevant legal 
document, the ILC’s Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, sets the strict limitation 
to its applicability. These are the transboundary requirement and the requirement that a 
breach has to be related to hazardous activities or substances that are otherwise not 
prohibited by international law but still containing the risk of physical damage410. Hence, the 
applicability of this type of argument is rather limited – though not irrelevant. 
From the perspective of autonomous systems, the notion of liability is very important. It 
forms a counterpart to the state responsibility doctrine, and thus it needs to be opened in 
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the present thesis as well. Autonomous systems will not conduct internationally wrongful 
acts for the most of the time and thus the state responsibility regime is relevant only as 
guiding legal doctrine for cases of illegal situations. Yet, ‘normal’ and legal conduct of 
autonomous systems is the most likely subjected to a certain degree of liability. How that 
liability is then allocated, and to what degree that allocation goes, cannot be fully discussed 
in the present thesis.   
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3 Testing the notion of state responsibility  
This chapter is the scenario case analysis of the thesis. The scenarios are constructed to 
contain particular features that are realistically imagined to represent future autonomous 
systems. These scenarios can be found from the annexes of the thesis. The methodology for 
choosing these features is following.  
Firstly, two scenarios are made to represent the opposite sides of the issue as far as possible. 
They are constructed to consist of chosen dichotomies were each of them represent the 
selected features of the system. These dichotomies are divided into five different categories: 
the background and manufacturing; the testing; the usage of the system; nature of the norm 
breach; and the timeline and duration of the usage. Within these categories there are 
twenty-three dichotomies – one side of the dichotomy can be found from scenario one and 
the other from scenario two. The dichotomies are selected to represent as extensively as 
possible the relevant issues related to the autonomous system. For example in the scenario 
one, the machine is made in a foreign country (from the point of view of the user) and in the 
scenario two the country of origin is the same as the user country. 411 Further, these features 
are selected to represent those issues that might have the biggest potential to be 
problematic from responsibility perspective. Secondly, the methodological premise is that 
the scenarios, and dichotomies within them, are written to describe premises and events. 
These descriptions are not written as a narrative but as a general representation of aspects 
important from the state responsibility perspective. Following, it is necessary to understand 
that all the dichotomies have to be considered forming the description of the event as a 
whole. Hence, the reading guide for the scenarios is that columns should be read as whole – 
one column represent all relevant issues related to the topic of the column. Thirdly, 
methodologically speaking, the chosen dichotomies are ultimately based on the subjective 
decision. There might be other features to be studied as well but these particular dichotomies 
were chosen because, from subjective perspective, they were the best to conceptualise 
problematic issues of autonomous systems. Fourthly, the analysis concentrates on 
international law and not to obvious political realities related to autonomous systems. Fifthly, 
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there is a genuine attempt to make these scenarios as sweeping as possible. Obviously, the 
aim is to be able to generalise the findings as much as possible. However, one cannot 
emphasise enough that in real life situations small details do matter and might settle the case 
differently. Lastly, the concentration of the analysis follows the same framing and restrictions 
than the present thesis in general412.  
The style in the following sub-chapters is chosen to address the relevant issues. The scenarios 
themselves are not repeated but they can be read from the annexes413. Hence, the text in 
these sub-chapters will only give the interpretations of the general rules that have been 
explained previously in the thesis.  
3.1 Manufacturing issues related to autonomous systems  
In this sub-chapter, the manufacturing issues of the scenarios are dealt. The purpose of this 
analysis is to discuss the role and limits of state responsibility from the perspective of a 
manufacturer. In this context liability doctrine shows the limits of the state responsibility 
doctrine. The material allocation of liability is not the aim of the thesis. Related to chapter 
3.1 especially relevant facts of the scenarios are from the background and building column 
and the testing column414. 
3.1.1 Scenario one  
In the scenario one, the internationally wrongful act has happened. Hence, the examination 
will concentrate on the fact whether a manufacturer state bears responsibility for it. The 
norm breach is related to the use of force and therefore the relevant primary norms can be 
found from that context. The role of manufacturer is from general state responsibility 
perspective rather small. Arguably, a manufacturer is not automatically attributable to a user 
state if the system is bought from a foreign country. It would mean that pursuant state 
responsibility doctrine this would settle the matter.  
Yet, the question remains whether the manufacturer, and a seller of the system, would 
constitute any type of joint action – namely perhaps the assistance of wrongful act. The 
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threshold here is whether the manufacturing state would actually sell the system with the 
knowledge of possible wrongful act. Since the situation in the scenario seems to be based on 
malfunction, it is hard to argue that manufacturing state would actually commit the act 
consciously. Hence, a manufacturer is probably not a co-author of the act. 
As a separate notion, primary norms might provide responsibilities for the manufacturer. In 
the context of scenario one, it is clear to say that state bears responsibility for manufacturing 
of weapons in their country – given that they are a party to the Additional protocol I415. This 
would include weapons manufactured by private companies. Thusly, if the malfunction that 
has taken place in the scenario is proven to be such that it will rise to the level of illegal 
weapon, the state would separately be responsible for the manufacturing of the weapon. It 
is important to realise that this would be separate responsibility from the actual wrongful act 
taking place in the scenario. Nevertheless, because of the primary norm, wrongful conduct 
of the manufacturing state would invoke responsibility.  
It is also rather obvious that user state has a contractual relationship towards the 
manufacturer. In the context of scenario one certain elements have been ordered by the user 
state and the seller (state) has been bound by contract to deliver them. This depends on the 
detailed requirements laid down by the buyer/user. Such an issue would be subordinate to 
any trade regime rules that the states might be involved. Hence, it would be a trade dispute 
related to not fulfilling the contract. However, a user state might be compelled to argue that 
a breach of contract, together would form material impossibility to fulfil user state 
obligations to give absolute guarantees of the autonomous system.  
Liability regime issues, in the context of international law, are relevant if damage has 
happened but there is no internationally wrongful act. Regarding the manufacturer’s role in 
the scenario one, the wrongful act has happened. Similarly, the possible primary norm breach 
would constitute an internationally wrongful act. Additionally, given that the doctrine is still 
precarious, it might be difficult to argue manufacturer’s liability without contractual 
obligation. If there would be such contractual obligation, it would settle the issue. However, 
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in the context of scenario one, the liability doctrine as it is in the contemporary international 
law would probably not be applicable. 
3.1.2 Scenario two  
In the scenario two, the operator state is also the builder state. Pursuant the main rules of 
state responsibility, attribution arises from a group of people acting in capacity of state. Since, 
in the scenario two there is only one state occupying both positions (operator and 
manufacturer) it is rather clear that the state’s possible responsibility or liability is not 
changed because of the manufacturing issues.  However, similar obligation pursuant the 
Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I are in place416. Since there is no difference as such, it is 
not relevant to do the same analysis again.  
3.2 Testing autonomous systems – from byers perspective 
Testing of the system is closely linked to the manufacturer and usage of the system. The 
purpose of the tester is to make sure that the system fulfils all the legal requirements. From 
responsibility perspective, the question is, whether the testing affects the allocation of state 
responsibility in international law. Obviously, domestic legal systems are not considered in 
this analysis. In the context of the present chapter, especially relevant facts of the scenarios 
can be found from the background and building column and the testing column of the 
scenarios417. 
3.2.1 Scenario one  
The state responsibility doctrine does not directly address testing as an action. The 
attribution to state is based on the status of the actor – not to the assumption she or he are 
concerning the workability of an equipment or an apparatus they are using. Hence, pursuant 
the main rule of state responsibility, and regardless of the fact that testing has been rather 
vigorous in the scenario one, the responsibility of the act is in accordance of the main rule.  
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In scenario one, it is clear that there are testing responsibilities arising from the primary rules 
of international law. The Article 36 of the Additional Protocol418 imposes such obligations 
that can be met only through testing. This is similar obligation as it is imposed on a 
manufacturer419. Hence, the testing of the system is compulsory, and negligence of testing, 
might lead to new internationally wrongful acts. 
Additionally, in the context of scenario one, the aspect that might change the situation is 
force majeure as a circumstance to preclude wrongfulness. For example self-defence and 
necessity would not be applicable in the situation of the scenario. As a reminder, a force 
majeure needed three conditions: ‘(a) the act in question must be brought about by an 
irresistible force or an unforeseen event; (b) which is beyond the control of the State 
concerned; and (c) which makes it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the 
obligation.’420 Also, as it has been shown previously, a state cannot contribute to the situation 
of force majeure. The vigorousness of the testing might have a connection towards the 
unforeseen part of the force majeure requirement. Whether malfunctioning, which is 
something that the tester tries to avoid, is an unforeseen event, is very much matter of 
interpretation and material possibility of testing. The state party that purchases the 
autonomous systems in question, might have willingness to argue that the event was 
unforeseen since it could not have been avoided despite the vigorous testing. Also in the 
context of reasonable expectation that seller would not have the right to manufacture such 
weapons421, the argument of force majeure becomes even stronger. Additionally it is 
reasonable to assume that the purchasing contract includes responsibilities to the 
manufacturer to follow the Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I. Still, such argument would 
stay vulnerable to criticism and lacks similar precedence in international law. One of the 
problems is the material impossibility of knowing. If risk is assumed, then force majeure 
cannot be invoked422. To accept malfunction in cases of vigorous testing as a proof of an 
unforeseen event is problematic because it would open the scope of precluding wrongfulness 
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for certain misuse. Additionally, the threshold of vigorousness of testing should then be 
analysed at a very detail level. Especially in cases when some features are prohibited to test 
by a seller of AxS, the behaviour of a testing state does not rise to the level of material 
impossibility. In those situations, the state has accepted not to test something and, thus, 
affected to the situation which means that testing state cannot later invoke force majeure. 
Regarding the B and C obligations mentioned above, they might actually be met. Still, the 
article 23 of ARSIWA has to be read as whole and, hence, testing would be under high scrutiny 
if it were to be accepted as something having a difference.  
Concerning the liability doctrine, the testing in the present scenario one is not that relevant. 
The norm breach in the present context is clear and so the applicable international law 
doctrine is state responsibility doctrine. Hence, the testing of the system does not affect the 
liability issue.  
3.2.2 Scenario two  
The testing part of the scenario two is very much similar as it is in the case of the 
manufacturer in chapter 3.1.2. Since, the state is involved in designing and manufacturing of 
the AxS, the tests are carried out simultaneously with the manufacturing process by the user 
state. Thusly, there are no reasons related to state responsibility doctrine to differentiate 
these two positions. However, vigorous testing might be shown as the evidence of 
prevention (or precautionary) measures if the act of the AxS will be classified as 
internationally wrongful act. Therefore testing cannot be neglected either.  
Given that there is a norm breach, the testing would not probably meet the standards of 
reason to preclude wrongfulness. Reason for this is that state should have known the risks 
since it has contributed to all the parts of inventing the AxS – as explained in previous sub-
chapter. Here only reason to preclude such wrongfulness would also be force majeure, which 
is already dealt as well. Although, from testing perspective it is good to remind that it is 
impossible to test everything imaginable. So, due diligence and best practices of testing have 
to be analysed in real life situation as well – yet, that is neither possible nor feasible in the 
present context.  
In the context of liability doctrine, the testing of the scenario two might have relevance in 
cases when the damage to other state is significant but not small or ultra-hazardous – 
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because of the primary norm in question423. It can be argued that in the context of scenario 
two the damage cannot be evaluated as small. So, if the damage remains ‘merely’ significant, 
preventive intent is relevant – as a due diligence obligation. Arguably, if a state has tried to 
minimize the risk, a state would not be liable for it. However, this position is vulnerable to 
critique as well. If the damage would be considered as ultra-hazardous, the testing would not 
preclude any wrongfulness or change liability. Nevertheless, even in these cases it might 
increase the unacceptability if the state would not have made the testing part properly. 
Ultimately, the liability doctrine, and the thresholds of it, might be complementary in state 
responsibility doctrine as well when analysing the reparations. However, that analysis is 
framed out from this thesis. 
3.3 Using and deployment of the autonomous systems 
Usage and deployment of the autonomous system is the most relevant part of the evaluation 
of responsibility and liability. It is the part where the attribution is usually established. In this 
chapter the relevant aspects are introduced from the perspective of the user, and hence the 
emphasis is solely on the issues mentioned in the scenarios. Related to chapter 3.3 especially 
relevant facts of the scenarios come from the usage of the system, the nature of the norm 
breach and the timeline and duration columns424. 
3.3.1 Scenario one 
The first thing to analyse is the norm breach. There is a good reason to argue that the act in 
question is internationally wrongful act. The primary norm is related to acceptable use of 
force and it depends on multiple factors and conditions that cannot be described here. 
However, it can be assumed that such incident would be against the international law – 
especially in not a wartime situation. Therefore it is assumed that the applicable doctrine in 
the scenario one is the state responsibility doctrine. Pursuant the doctrine, the attribution 
has to be confirmed as well. As a fairly off-the-loop machine, the autonomous system in 
question is not directly controlled by the operator but still the AxS itself does not form a legal 
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link to the operating state. It is the status of the operator, and the operation command 
structure, that form the connection in question. So, the main rule is fulfilled and at least the 
operator state is responsible for the action. 
Concerning the position of other states, there is a good reason to argue co-authority of 
wrongful act. Especially the operation’s leader nation is pretty much automatically involved 
alongside with the operator nation. Additionally, it is important to remember that AxS is 
literally speaking a system dependent on the e.g. signal and visual information provided for 
it by multiple sources. Hence, it is lucrative to argue that purely from the perspective of 
international law, the states that are providing support for the system are part of the action 
as well. This is based on the ICJ’s view on the supportive role of other actors425. Therefore, 
these actors supporting the system would also form a link to their states, making these 
supporting states co-authors of internationally wrongful act. 
If the system has been captured by hackers, the system is not operated by the state of origin 
anymore. Similarly, if hackers change the operation parameters of the system, the link to the 
state of origin becomes unclear. The original user state could argue that hacking caused a 
reason to preclude wrongfulness depending on the nature of the hacking. There is a 
requirement that state cannot contribute to such reason. Hence, there is clear obligation not 
to provide assistance to the capture of the AxS. Additionally, the obligation would probably 
include a positive requirement to provide reasonable amount of protection against such 
hacking – but since no such case has been evaluated by the courts it is hard to evaluate the 
actual threshold. Lastly, the state would bear responsibility to try to restore the AxS in its 
control if it wishes to avoid state responsibility. 
Regarding the timeline factors, the action taken after the wrongful act has been identified is 
critical. In the scenario one the state of origin has applied correct protocol and ended the 
mission. This is in accordance with the ARSIWA doctrine426. Still, the effects of the wrongful 
act reach long into the future. This means that the consequences of the wrongful act fall to 
the state of origin – probably compensations. The question of consequences is, however, 
framed outside of the thesis and thus will not be dealt. Regarding the future activity of the 
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AxS that has committed the norm breach, it is rather clear that the state has knowledge of 
wrongful act. This would mean that state has even less basis to invoke reason to preclude 
similar wrongfulness. To put it in other way, the responsibility over the action of the AxS is 
even greater after the norm breach. 
The liability doctrine, as it means acts not prohibited by international law, is not applicable in 
the context of scenario one from the point of view of the user state.  
3.3.2 Scenario two  
The question, whether an internationally wrongful act has happened, is related to the 
primary norms of the state in question. Also, the evaluation of the norm breach is linked to 
the action itself and consequences related to it. It is therefore not clear whether a state bear 
specific, mainly convention, responsibilities in the context of scenario two. The most 
apparent applicable convention is United Nations Law of the Sea which is almost universally 
ratified. Thusly, in the present context it is assumed that it will form the norm base. Pursuant 
the UNCLOS, and arguably customary law, there is an obligation not cause damage to the 
environment of another states – in accordance with the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas 
principle427. There is no reason to believe that the main rule would not apply in the context 
of scenario two. 
The original and intended action in the scenario two is not prohibited as such. But, the action 
taken led to a norm breach since it caused damage to other states. Therefore it has to be 
analysed whether this damage itself constitutes internationally wrongful act. Regarding this 
analysis, it is critical whether this is damage would rise to the level of significant or 
ultrahazardous. Low level damage would not constitute internationally wrongful act nor 
would state be liable for it. Ultrahazardous would constitute internationally wrongful act and 
responsibility rather surely. The level of significant damage is the problematic one.  
Arguably there is an obligation to prevent significant harm from taking place. In the second 
scenario, the norm breach can be categorized as an accident. Thusly, the affect it had was 
unintended and presumably due diligence was applied through-out the process. Though the 
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90 
 
 
threshold of reasons to preclude wrongfulness are arguably not met because of the 
accidental nature of the incident. A state contributes to the situation even in cases of 
accidents. Hence, it can be concluded that responsibility lies within the state that has caused 
the accident.  
The liability doctrine contributes to the analysis in that the situation in scenario two would 
probably invoke liability for any significant or hazardous damage even without wrongful act. 
However, since it has been concluded that norm breach has happened, this analysis is not 
that relevant. 
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4 Conclusion  
The present thesis has been about state responsibility in the context of autonomous systems. 
State responsibility doctrine, as one of the prime aspects of international law, is a widely 
analysed doctrine of law. Responsibility questions are at the core of law and the notion of 
state responsibility has definitely a major role in international legal order. It is for that reason 
why state responsibility was chosen as the legal framework of the thesis. The premise and 
justification for the topic of this thesis are the growing interest in autonomy within technical 
solutions. In the contemporary literature these solutions are often called autonomous 
systems and it is the term used in this thesis as well. The thesis has been written in 
cooperation with the Finnish Defence Forces.  
In addition to pure technological research, there is also legal, ethical and political analysis of 
the social impact these technologies are assumed to produce. The spreading interest is very 
much due to the huge potential these systems contain. The assumed changes include for 
example a wider range of operational capabilities and faster decision-making systems for 
high tempo situations. Autonomous systems are also assumed to minimise threats towards 
humans both because of the roles that are planned for the machines and the information 
these machines are assumed to provide. The critique of autonomous systems is based from 
ethical, and also from legal, perspectives to the lack of trust in decision-making capabilities 
that are given to these sets of machines. Also, the sceptics tend to underline the possible 
breaches of law that autonomous systems might commit. This conflict of arguments is highly 
visible in the context of lethal autonomous systems. System approach is also an important 
part of these technologies in that autonomous systems refer to sets of machines including 
for example censors, elements of communication and executing apparatuses.  
The purpose of the thesis was to analyse autonomous systems from legal perspective. In the 
meta-level the objective was to analyse whether autonomous systems, as a set of technology 
which changes the role of human as a decision-maker, are something that challenges the 
usability of the basic principle of international responsibility – namely the state responsibility. 
The chosen research questions were: firstly, what are the main legal issues when applying 
the state responsibility in the context of autonomous systems; and secondly, what special 
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questions arise from the framework of state responsibility regarding manufacturing, testing 
and using autonomous systems. 
Substantively the defining term of the thesis is autonomous systems. It refers to a set of 
technologies that have specific autonomous features. The question of a human influence is 
crucial for understanding the concept. In the thesis three categories to define human role are 
in-the-loop, on-the-loop and off-the-loop. The in-the-loop systems are categorised as 
systems where a human has the control over all the action taken by the set of machines. The 
on-the-loop systems are systems where a human is supervising the action of the system. The 
off-the-loop systems have potential to act without human supervision and to a certain extent 
to learn and adapt in unpredictable circumstances. The categorisation illustrates rather well 
the different roles of humans and simultaneously the changing link between humans and a 
system of machines. The off-the-loop systems are the closest representation of autonomous 
systems. It is also acknowledged that totally off-the-loop systems do not exist as such. 
Therefore, while still referring to autonomous systems, it is recognised that in fact these 
systems are systems with autonomous capabilities. 
Regarding the main legal issues when applying the state responsibility in the context of 
autonomous systems, the analysis concentrated on the state agent, the act of a state, the 
attribution of an act to one state or multiple states, the reasons to preclude wrongfulness 
and the action of ultra vires. This main part of the analysis was accompanied with explanation 
of sources of state responsibility and a short historical section to give context and depth to 
the answers of the main research questions. Additionally, the analysis included an overview 
on due diligence aspects and the relevance of liability from acts not prohibited by 
international law.  
State responsibility culminates in two main aspects. Firstly, the action has to be 
internationally wrongful. A norm breach based on any source of international law is sufficient 
to be categorised as internationally wrongful act. These norms are called primary norms. It is 
worthy to underline that damage is not a precondition for wrongfulness or responsibility but 
it is only after a breach of international legal norm when responsibility can be established. 
Secondly, the internationally wrongful act in question has to be attributable to state. 
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Accordingly, attribution can result from an act or an omission. Both of them are equally 
relevant. 
A machine or a technological system cannot be a state agent. It is always a person or a group 
of humans that form the state agent in the state responsibility doctrine. Hence, the act of a 
state is always done by those people – not by the machine. In order to clarify the 
phenomenon, an act of autonomous system becomes attributable to state through those 
people who are either operators of the machine (controlling, supervising, sending or 
inputting parameters) or those who are forming the command structure of the operation 
involved in the use of autonomous systems. Even when the actual norm breach might have 
taken place because of the decision-making process of the machine itself, it is the people 
behind the machine that form the attribution to state in the light of state responsibility 
doctrine. The actual circumstances define which one of the two is preferred if the two are 
separate from each other. From the state responsibility perspective the user state is the first 
to form attribution. This is the case especially when looking at the responsibilities related to 
the actions of autonomous systems. Regarding the manufacturing of autonomous systems, 
there are primary norms that could lead internationally wrongful acts committed by that 
state and thusly to international responsibility. Also, some specific aspects regarding the 
responsibilities of manufacturer were analysed in the scenarios. 
In cases where an internationally wrongful act takes place in an operation including several 
states, there is a good chance that the responsibility is attributed to the participant states. 
Because autonomous systems may include components from several states, there is a 
possibility that these systems might increase the chance of joint responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts. Additionally, ultra vires activity does not automatically change 
the attribution. Only after failing to take back the control of rebel units, the responsibility for 
possible wrongfulness might change. The same rule applies to the autonomous systems 
context. It is also important to remember that machines themselves, even when acting in an 
unwanted manner due to their decision-making, cannot act ultra vires – those situations are 
categorised as malfunctioning. 
The evaluation of due diligence is relevant in the state responsibility context of autonomous 
systems in manufacturing, testing and using situations. Due diligence seems to be norm 
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specific and is not applicable in all situations as a threshold of legality. However, for many 
internationally wrongful acts, due diligent bona fide activity may be relevant when evaluating 
whether a norm breach has taken place or not. Even in cases when a norm breach has not 
taken place there may be liability issues to be analysed as well. Autonomous systems might 
in many cases engage in activities which are not internationally prohibited but are harmful 
for other states. In these cases, the applicable doctrine is liability doctrine – given that it is 
contested and remains vulnerable to criticism. Autonomous systems designers should, 
however, be very aware of such possibility and apply preventive measures to contain any 
damage that might be caused by these machines.  
Regarding the second research question, the special questions arising in the context of 
manufacturing, testing and deploying autonomous systems, the scenario analysis produced 
more concrete examples and answers. The analysis contains two separate scenarios that are 
constructed to represent opposite sides of the issue. Methodologically the scenarios include 
dichotomies that represent aspects that can be assumed to be interesting in the context of 
autonomous systems. The scenarios are not narratives but more descriptions of possible 
international wrongful acts and situations leading to them. 
In the first scenario, the role of a manufacturer is subjected to Article 36 of the Additional 
Protocol I due to the fact that the autonomous system was an autonomous weapon system. 
The article obligates every state to make sure that the weapon technology they are 
developing or adopting follows international law. Hence, both the manufacturer and the 
buyer of these autonomous weapon systems are subjected to this provision. Also the user 
state would bear responsibility over the internationally wrongful action taking place in the 
scenario. Hence, scenario one illustrated different issues which the building, testing, or using 
autonomous weapon systems may face. It also includes an analysis of possible outside 
influence by hacking possible responsibility to other states involved.  
The second scenario includes a different type of international wrongful act. In this scenario 
the focus is in environmental norm breach. In this situation, primary norms arise especially 
from international environmental law and law of the sea frameworks. The secondary norms 
are rather clear since it can be established that the user state bears the responsibility over 
the machine they are using. The primary norm analysis, however, is closely linked to the 
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analysis of harm and the preventive measures. The analysis of chapter 2 also includes due 
diligence consideration. In the context of the harm caused to other states, testing a machine 
is due diligence related matter. 
To summarise, the state responsibility analysis is only a first step in the legal analysis of 
autonomous systems. Throughout this thesis it is demonstrated that the applicability of the 
state responsibility doctrine in the context of autonomous systems is evident. The overall 
finding of the thesis is that state responsibility cannot be avoided in the cases when there are 
internationally wrongful acts connected to the behaviour or manufacturing of autonomous 
systems. Similarly all other branches of state responsibility doctrine, such as reasons to 
preclude wrongfulness, are applicable and relevant in the regulatory framework of 
autonomous systems. Also, the amount of primary norms that might be linked to the usage 
of autonomous systems is definitely vast and needs a lot of attention in the future. State 
responsibility is undoubtedly an upper level legal framework for the deployment of 
autonomous systems.  
After the present thesis, many legal aspects of autonomous systems remain uncharted. 
Remaining research topics include the applicability of numerous primary norms within the 
limits of international criminal law, humanitarian law and human rights. In terms of domains, 
it can be assumed that all of them remain important. For example the law of the sea might 
come across questions like the definition of autonomous vessels. Also for example in cyber 
domain, human rights clauses related to the data collected by autonomous systems might 
become part of the legal debate of data protection as technologies develop. The most heated 
contemporary debate over the use of lethal force by autonomous systems will most likely 
also continue for years given the reluctance of the great weapons manufacturers to 
implement any restrictions to their industries. Foreseeable debate over the limits of artificial 
intelligence will probably open possibilities for legal analysis as well. Overall, the legal 
research clearly has a huge role in debate over the future of autonomous technologies. 
   
 
Annexes:  
Annex 1: 
Scenario 1 
The 
background 
and building   
The testing The usage of the 
system (while 
breaching the 
norm in 
question) 
The nature of 
the norm 
breach 
The timeline and 
duration of the 
usage 
Built by 
another state 
and it has then 
purchased by 
the state using 
it.  
 
In the 
negotiation 
stage and 
just before 
the 
purchase.  
On the ground, in 
the air and/or in 
the space.  
The premise 
of the norm is 
that it is 
generally 
considered 
strong and 
important. 
Medium duration 
operation. The 
breach of an 
obligation takes 
place within 
hours.  
Since the 
autonomous 
system is 
foreign built, 
the buyer has 
set the 
technical and 
operational 
requirements 
for the 
autonomous 
system they 
are about to 
buy. However, 
the buyer is 
not designing 
or inventing 
the mentioned 
capabilities. 
 
Despite the 
best efforts, 
something 
will remain 
untested. 
These 
features are 
either 
unknown, 
something 
that cannot 
be tested, 
or 
something 
that is 
forbidden 
to test in 
the 
purchasing 
contract.  
The machine is 
relatively far 
from an 
operator. 
Autonomy of the 
machine system 
is in those 
situations close 
to the off-the-
loop level.  
The 
internationally 
wrongful act is 
related to the 
use of force. 
The norm breach 
ends before there 
was an 
opportunity to 
stop it. After the 
internationally 
wrongful act has 
been identified, 
the autonomous 
system fleet has 
been called back 
for investigation. 
However, the 
machines 
themselves are so 
valuable that they 
continue to be 
used in the 
operation later. 
   
 
The buyer 
state of the 
autonomous 
system is in 
loose 
collaboration 
with a 
company that 
is 
manufacturing 
the 
autonomous 
system.  
 The machine 
possesses 
capabilities to 
adapt its 
behaviour 
reflecting the 
changing 
operational 
requirements. 
These capabilities 
could be 
described as 
capability to 
learn new ways 
of problem 
solving especially 
when acting in 
off-the-loop 
missions.  
A fleet of 
autonomous 
systems has 
engaged using 
military force 
against a 
target that 
later was 
shown to 
unauthorized 
target.  
The effect of the 
internationally 
wrongful act is 
long since the 
situation cannot 
be restored and 
reinstated to 
normal.  
  The autonomous 
system is military 
hardware and 
software. It is 
used in military 
led mission.  
The 
geographical 
effect is fairly 
limited. 
 
  The operation in 
question is led by 
another state 
than owns this 
particular 
autonomous 
system. It is 
therefore a joint 
operation.  
It is not a war 
time, even 
though some 
force has been 
used. 
 
   
 
  A great amount 
of operational 
information 
come from 
foreign sources.  
  
  The autonomous 
system might be 
subjected to 
outside 
interference such 
as hacking or 
hijacking – it 
remains unclear. 
  
   
 
Annex 2 
Scenario 2 
 
The background 
and building  
The testing The usage of the 
system (while 
breaching the norm 
in question) 
The nature 
of the norm 
breach 
The timeline 
and duration 
of the usage 
Built in the 
same state that 
is using it. 
Additionally, it 
has been 
bought from 
domestic 
company.  
Throughout 
the whole 
process of 
designing, 
building 
and when 
purchasing.  
On the surface of 
the sea and 
underwater.  
The norm 
itself is 
recognised 
but there are 
factors of 
interpretatio
n relating to 
the 
application of 
it.  
The act that 
leads to an 
internationally 
wrongful act 
takes place in 
a short period 
of time. 
Since the 
autonomous 
system is 
domestic build, 
the same state 
has also set the 
technical and 
operational 
requirements 
for the 
autonomous 
system. These 
requirements 
can be adjusted 
throughout the 
manufacturing 
process rather 
easily. 
Something 
remains 
untested. 
The reason 
is related to 
the process 
issues 
and/or to 
the fact 
that they 
are 
unknown. 
Rather close to the 
operator. Human is 
on-the-loop and 
possess a possibility 
to go in-the-loop 
mode.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environment
al norm. 
Polluting 
environment. 
Instantly there 
is a knowledge 
that a breach 
of norm has 
occurred and 
the action is 
halted. 
   
 
The state using 
the autonomous 
system has a 
significant role 
in building it 
together with a 
domestic 
company. 
 Only very limited 
learning capabilities. 
The autonomous 
system gets its 
commands and 
procedural 
requirements are 
mostly 
preprogrammed. 
The 
autonomous 
system that 
went to 
repair and 
assistant in 
repairing of a 
broken 
electronic 
cable. While 
doing that it 
accidently 
damaged an 
oil pipeline 
causing 
environment
al damage.  
Even though 
the action that 
led to the 
norm breach 
did not take 
long, the 
duration of the 
breach is long 
since the 
environmental 
damage 
cannot be 
stopped within 
a couple of 
days.  
  Originally, military 
hardware and 
software used in a 
civilian led 
operation.  
The effect is 
international 
but regional. 
The effect of 
the 
internationally 
wrongful act is 
long. Restoring 
the formed 
status is 
difficult, 
however, not 
impossible.  
  Actions have 
conduct under 
authority of one 
state. There was not 
international 
cooperation related 
to the operation. 
It is not a war 
time. 
 
   
 
  Practically all 
intelligence, and 
other information 
concerning the 
operation, is from 
domestic sources of 
the user.  
  
  The autonomous 
system is not 
subjected to any 
outside interference. 
  
 
